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THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PRO-BUSINESS PARADOX
Elizabeth Pollman∗
INTRODUCTION
Corporations have long posed conceptual difficulties in a variety of
doctrinal contexts. From the first cases involving corporate claims for
protection under the U.S. Constitution,1 to early recognitions of
corporate criminal liability a century later,2 the Supreme Court has an
extensive history of inquiring into the nature of corporations and what
that answer might tell us about their rights and responsibilities.3 It has
often come up short in this regard — for example, using thin characterizations of corporations as “artificial entities” or “creatures” given their
separate legal personality, or as “associations of persons” or “aggregates”
given the human interests at stake.4 At times, the Court has ignored or
dismissed as irrelevant the corporate identity of a rights claimant or
litigant,5 or it has simply acted pragmatically, such as to discard an “old
and exploded doctrine” that no longer fit societal realities regarding
corporate liability.6
The Court has continued this struggle with corporations in the
twenty-first century. With rising globalization, technological development, and complexity in business organizations, the divergence grows
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For valuable comments and suggestions, thanks to Ellen Aprill, Bill Bratton, Vince Buccola, Jill Fisch, Sarah Haan, Dorothy Lund,
Amelia Miazad, James Nelson, Kish Parella, Jennifer Rothman, Amanda Shanor, Beth Simmons,
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Karen Tani, Bob Thompson, Andrea Wang, Adam Winkler, Yesha Yadav, Adam
Zimmerman, participants of the faculty workshop at American University Washington College of
Law, and the editors and members of the Harvard Law Review.
1 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Bank of the U.S. v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
2 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
3 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2015) (examining the history of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68–
105 (1992) (describing the development of corporate theory in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates on corporate personhood); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW
AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS xvi (2018) (telling the history of the “corporate rights movement”).
4 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 3, at 1695, 1717 (describing nineteenth- and twentieth-century
case law on corporate rights using views of the corporation as an artificial entity or an association
of individuals).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977); Grosjean v. Am.
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
6 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 496.
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between the Court’s characterizations or abstractions and the realities
of corporations. For example, blockbuster cases on corporate rights in
the Roberts Court era, such as Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission7 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,8 paint a picture
of corporations as “associations of citizens”9 and as rights bearers for
“the humans who own and control [them].”10 People do not, however,
typically look at their 401(k) account and think about civic participation
in expressive associations. Nor does one generally think of a national
chain with hundreds of stores as the same as its small handful of
shareholders. While expanding corporate rights to political spending
and religious liberty, the Court’s opinions in these cases gave little sense
of the distance between its view of corporations and their reality to
everyday people who participate in them and bear the weight of their
activity.
Further, in shaping and interpreting the law on rights and responsibilities, the Court continues to struggle not only with questions of what
are corporations and whom do they serve — but also where are corporations?11 Adequate resolutions to these questions seem as far from
grasp as at any time in the past. Corporations can transcend borders,
change form to arbitrage or to take advantage of laws, outsource
activity, and divide into subsidiaries around the world.12 Analogies between corporations and natural persons often fall flat as they do not
capture these capabilities, the roles and relationships among corporate
participants created by internal governance, and the related facts and
values.13 Attempts to parse where corporate conduct occurred can
become roadmaps for corporations to evade liability.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7
8
9
10
11

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 707.
See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 810–12 (1935) (observing the question “[w]here is a corporation?,” id. at 809, is “the language
of transcendental nonsense,” id. at 812, that courts approached in “essentially supernatural terms,”
id. at 811, and “without appreciation of the economic, social, and ethical values which it involves,”
id. at 812).
12 For a sampling of literature on these topics, see generally ACHIEVING WORKERS’ RIGHTS
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Richard P. Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2016);
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT
SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD (2016); BARNALI
CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC (2019); RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Alice de Jonge & Roman Tomasic eds.,
2017); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); and Frank Partnoy,
Shapeshifting Corporations, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2009).
13 See James D. Nelson, Facts and Values in Corporate Legal Theory, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 240, 241 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021) [hereinafter Nelson, Facts and Values in Corporate Legal Theory] (discussing the need to inquire into the interests at stake and contextual facts and relationships, rather

222

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:220

In the recent Supreme Court Term, three of the world’s largest
corporations — Ford, Nestlé USA, Inc. (Nestlé), and Cargill — argued
that they could not be held accountable to plaintiff victims in the jurisdictions in which these litigants brought suit. In Ford Motor Co. v.
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,14 the global auto company asserted that personal jurisdiction was lacking in two products liability
suits stemming from accidents that injured residents in Montana and
Minnesota, where the Ford vehicles arrived through resales and
relocations.15 In Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,16 together with Cargill, Inc.
v. Doe,17 the food giants defended themselves against claims under the
Alien Tort Statute18 (ATS) brought by plaintiffs who were enslaved as
children on cocoa farms in Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) and who maintained that the corporate defendants had aided and abetted human
rights violations in their supply chains from their U.S. headquarters.19
Nestlé and Cargill boldly asserted that they had categorical immunity
as U.S. corporations, and, alternatively, that the Court should parse
where the relevant conduct occurred and find it outside the reach of the
statute.20
Critically, both cases hinged upon the Court’s understanding of
corporations and where it located their activity for purposes of potential
liability. And, in each of these two consolidated cases, ranging on the
merits from products liability to international human rights, the
corporate defendants attempted to avoid legal responsibility through
clever arguments that put corporations on better footing than individuals. Many observers would find the cases quite unsurprising in this
regard. Corporations are shaped by a complex mix of forces, including
both internal and external governance and rules of the game —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
than the nature of corporate “beings,” in determining corporate rights); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1630–31 (describing the weakness of using
flawed conceptions and metaphors of the corporation instead of “the purpose of the constitutional
right at issue, and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corporation — and thereby to the people underlying the corporation,” id. at 1631).
14 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). This case was consolidated with Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer. Id. at
1017.
15 Id. at 1023.
16 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021). This case was consolidated with Cargill, Inc. v. Doe. Id. at 1931.
17 141 S. Ct. 184 (2020) (mem.).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
19 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1935.
20 Id. at 1936 (“Petitioners . . . argue that respondents improperly seek extraterritorial
application of the ATS.”); see also id. at 1940 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court granted
certiorari to consider the petitioners’ argument that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) exempts corporations from suit.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (No. 19-416) [hereinafter Nestlé Oral Argument], https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2020/19-416_6k47.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YDN-6BCZ] (asserting that corporations
should have categorical immunity under the ATS and requesting dismissal on the basis of prohibited
extraterritorial application).
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corporate and securities laws govern the “internal” world of corporations
and everything else is perceived as “external,” such as civil procedure,
human rights, environmental law, labor law, consumer protection, and
so on.21 Corporations have often pushed for rights and challenged external rules and regulations that create responsibility, and as the
Supreme Court in recent years has appeared to take a friendly stance
toward their claims, it has developed a “pro-business” reputation.22
Although far from absolute, whether one takes a quantitative or
qualitative approach to the question, it is possible to observe that corporations and business litigants have often succeeded in their claims
before the Court and in shaping the direction of the law.23 This past
Term, Nestlé and Cargill did not obtain categorical immunity, but they
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is
Corporate Law?, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 23 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the goal of corporate law as “maximiz[ing] the value of firms” based on the “assumption . . . that any externalities
that the corporation generates are best addressed by regulatory constraints from other areas of
law”); Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of Mechanisms for Regulating
Corporate Conduct, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 657, 657, 660 (observing that “[c]orporate discourse often
distinguishes between internal and external regulation of corporate behavior,” id. at 657, and arguing that regulatory processes could improve “by focusing on how legal rules operate rather than
their nominal categorization as ‘corporate law’ or ‘external law,’” id. at 660).
22 See, e.g., Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Big Business Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
8, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/empirical-scotus-the-big-business-court
[https://perma.cc/7EXV-4TMQ] (“The current Supreme Court is friendly toward big business . . . perhaps as friendly as any court dating back to the Lochner era, when laissez-faire policies
permeated the court’s rulings.”); Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisionsare-defining-this-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5676-P65N] (noting that the Roberts
Court’s rulings have been “far friendlier to business than those of any court since at least World
War II”).
23 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1451, 1472 (2013) (finding “the Roberts Court is much
friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts,” id. at 1472, and that, over the
span of 1946 to 2011, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas rank in the top five
Justices most favorable to business, id.); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
When It Comes to Business, the Right and Left Sides of the Court Agree, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
33, 33 (2017) (finding that, in the Roberts Court era, “the current Democratic and Republican appointees support business at record levels”); MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND
POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 204, 213 (2013) (arguing that the “overall balance sheet in
business cases fits the ‘pro-business’ view of the Court reasonably well,” id. at 213, and the “procedural” cases on arbitration, class actions, and statutory limitations “capture[] the Roberts Court’s
way of being pro-business: the use of procedural rules that favor the big guys,” id. at 204); cf.
Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction to BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 1, 12 (Jonathan H.
Adler ed., 2016) (“[T]he Roberts Court can be called probusiness insofar as it is sympathetic to some
basic business-oriented legal claims, reads statutes narrowly, resists finding implied causes of action,
has adopted a skeptical view of antitrust complaints, and does not place its finger on the scales to
assist non-business litigants. . . . [T]his is a Court that business likes — except when it
doesn’t . . . [and] the Court’s tendencies in business-related cases are not easily reduced to a hashtag
slogan.”).
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emerged victorious in their claim that the plaintiffs’ complaint impermissibly sought extraterritorial application of the ATS. Even though a
majority of the Justices seemed prepared to hold domestic corporations
to the same standard of liability as natural persons under the ATS,
Nestlé and Cargill convinced the Court to accept a narrow view of
where they could be held accountable for their conduct. The Court
flatly rejected as insufficient the plaintiffs’ allegations that the corporate
defendants made “major operational decisions” in the United States,
reversing the decision below and allowing Nestlé and Cargill to avoid a
trial on the merits.24 Ford, by contrast, lost its bid to aggressively draw
lines around where it could be sued for products liability, as the Court
stood by existing precedent and ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Yet the case
might still reflect a pro-business trend as an instance of corporate
overreach following a string of corporate wins that have reshaped
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Ford’s audacious argument that it could
not be sued in Montana and Minnesota because the particular cars involved in the plaintiffs’ accidents were not originally sold in-state exemplifies just how far the law has already evolved in corporate
defendants’ favor.25
Other cases from the recent Term also help to fill out this picture of
the Court’s approach to corporations. Most notably, in Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta,26 the Court endorsed a robust
understanding of the First Amendment right to freedom of association
for nonprofit corporations and other charitable organizations. In a
splintered majority opinion, the Court held that a California regulation
unconstitutionally burdened associational rights by requiring these
organizations to disclose donor information to the state’s Attorney
General’s Office for potential investigation into fraud and other wrongdoing.27 The Court’s willingness to strike down the regulation and raise
the bar on the “exacting scrutiny” standard suggests that campaign finance regulations and other compelled disclosure regimes — even for
business corporations — may be dismantled or threatened in the future.
Thus, from parsing the location of corporate activity for accountability to shielding organizations from disclosures on the basis of
associational freedom, these cases provide valuable entry points for exploring how the Court’s conceptions of corporations shape its jurisprudence. And yet digging into these cases also reveals that the
pro-business label is at once correct but also wrong — or at least too
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24
25

Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1935–36.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021) (discussing Ford’s
argument “that jurisdiction is improper because the particular car involved in the crash was not
first sold in the forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there”); see also Alexandra D.
Lahav, The New Privity in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (tracing the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine).
26 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
27 Id. at 2383.
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simple. Corporations have often been empowered with rights and
unburdened from responsibilities. Certainly this can be understood as
favorable to business organizations in the broad sense. But deeper
examination reveals that an enormous diversity of corporations exists
and serves the interests of many different constituencies — many of
whom do not benefit from, or welcome, this “pro-business”
jurisprudence. The very notion of what is in the “business” interest of
a corporation is highly contested and varies widely across corporations
and participants. Cases from the recent Term, and others from the
Roberts Court era, therefore also present an opportunity to examine the
complex relationship between the Court’s treatment of corporations and
contrasting trends regarding corporate law and governance.
This Comment makes two primary contributions. It first observes
that cases from the recent Term reflect an important way in which the
Roberts Court has earned its reputation: over the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the Court has often expanded corporate rights
while narrowing corporate liability or access to justice against corporate
defendants. Part I of this Comment sets forth this argument, using
Americans for Prosperity, Ford, and Nestlé as case studies to show how
the Court uses ill-fitting conceptions or overbroad generalizations to
empower corporations and limit their accountability.
This trend gives rise to a paradox that Part II subsequently explores:
the “pro-business” Court is often at odds with internal activity in corporate law and governance. Quite remarkably, as the Roberts Court has
expanded corporate rights and narrowed pathways to liability, many
shareholders and stakeholders have become vocal participants, putting
pressure on corporations to rein in the use of their rights, to mitigate
risks generated by their externalities, and to take account of
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns. The Court’s
expansion of corporate rights not only disserves many corporate
participants and spurs them to action but also might fuel challenges to
new disclosure rules about corporate political activity or other
ESG-related concerns that investors and others seek for effective participation in corporate governance. Further, as the Court has downplayed or ignored corporate decisionmaking structures in its
jurisprudence expanding rights and narrowing liability, by contrast, in
the world of corporate law and governance, we see that board oversight,
monitoring, and compliance functions have grown in importance. State
corporate law cases have heightened attention on the board’s role in
providing oversight to ensure legal compliance throughout the corporation’s operations and to mitigate litigation and reputational risks that
can arise from corporate abuses around the world. Corporate compliance programs and voluntary ESG initiatives have proliferated amid
widespread debate about the purpose of the corporation and a broadened role for stakeholders.
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Looking at these diverging developments together suggests that, at
least in some important circumstances, the Supreme Court’s approach
may not capture the reality of modern business corporations, and it
might not be what many shareholders and corporate participants
actually want. It may instead create new tensions in corporations that
are not fully and easily resolved through private ordering and that undermine the conceptual foundation for the existing arrangements in
corporate law and governance. It may also ultimately serve only a limited set of business interests — not the great number of workers who
are often framed as stakeholders on the other side of “pro-business”
jurisprudence, nor the majority of public corporation shareholders, who
are increasingly diversified through institutions that rely on external
regulation to constrain corporations and minimize systematic risk. And
so, in sum, corporations might bear little resemblance to the Court’s
characterizations, and the business world, on the whole, might often be
better off without “pro-business” jurisprudence that empowers
corporations and erodes their external constraints.
I. EXPANDING CORPORATE RIGHTS AND LIMITING
RESPONSIBILITIES IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
When scholars have approached the question of whether the Roberts
Court is pro-business, they have used a variety of methods ranging from
coding and counting cases to qualitative analyses in different subject
areas.28 All of the leading accounts have reached the conclusion that, in
various qualified ways, and without singular meaning, the answer is
yes — it is “pro-business.”29
This Part explores one of the most notable but less explored trends
of this era — the expansion of corporate rights and narrowing of liability
or access to justice against corporate defendants. Landmark cases from
previous Terms such as Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have garnered
significant attention on the first part of the equation — expanding
rights.30 Running through these cases is a failure to capture the full
nature, dynamics, and facts on the ground of corporations. By describing corporations as “associations of citizens” in a “corporate

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28
29
30

See sources cited supra note 23.
See sources cited supra note 23.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014).
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democracy,”31 and projecting the beliefs of shareholders onto corporations,32 the Court has empowered corporations with greater speech
rights and religious liberty.33 In Citizens United, the Court held that
corporations have a First Amendment right to make independent political expenditures.34 In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 199335 (RFRA) applied to three closely held
business corporations, allowing them to claim a religious exemption
from providing certain contraceptive coverage to their employees.36 In
both cases, the Court extended protections — either constitutional or
statutory — to for-profit business corporations.
And, although Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are the most
well-known recent corporate rights cases, they are not alone. The Court
has also invigorated the commercial speech doctrine37 and given a forum
for a business corporation’s claim to a First Amendment right to
discriminate against customers.38 Most recently, in Cedar Point Nursery
v. Hassid,39 the Court validated agricultural employers’ claims that
sought Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection against a state regulation that provided periodic access to their farm property for labor
union organizers.40 As discussed by Professor Nikolas Bowie in this
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 354 (referring to corporations as “associations of citizens”); id. at
361–62 (reasoning that there is “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 794 (1978))).
32 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720 (“By requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies
to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously
violates their religious beliefs” (emphasis added)).
33 See Kent Greenfield & Daniel A. Rubens, Corporate Personhood and the Putative First
Amendment Right to Discriminate, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND
PERSONHOOD, supra note 13, at 283, 285 (discussing the failure of the Supreme Court to
acknowledge the separate legal personality of corporations in Hobby Lobby); Elizabeth Pollman,
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 672–73 (2016) (critiquing the Supreme
Court’s characterization of corporations in Citizens United); Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 495–514 (same).
34 558 U.S. at 365.
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
36 573 U.S. at 736.
37 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011) (striking down a state restriction
on the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmaceutical prescription records for marketing purposes).
38 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018). The
case involved a bakery corporation that refused to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple, which
was challenged by Colorado as a violation of its state antidiscrimination law. Id. at 1723. The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the claims asserted by the business corporation
and individual baker-shareholder of a First Amendment free exercise and speech right to
discriminate against the same-sex couple. Id. at 1727. It ultimately decided the case on another
ground — that the state commission had failed to treat the asserted religious beliefs in a neutral
and unbiased manner. Id. at 1723–24.
39 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
40 Id. at 2080.
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issue, the case takes a sweeping approach to Takings Clause jurisprudence in favor of the employers41 — operating as corporations or
through other forms of business organization. Further, as noted above,
in Americans for Prosperity, the Court sided with nonprofit organizations, under the First Amendment freedom of association, in their facial
challenge to a state disclosure requirement that facilitated regulatory
oversight.42 The Roberts Court has recognized the most expansive scope
of corporate constitutional rights in U.S. history.43
Other cases from the recent Term, Ford and Nestlé, provide insight
into the latter part of the equation about how the Court tilts or narrows
the procedural rules and external laws regulating corporations.44 Ford
involved the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction,45 and Nestlé involved the Alien Tort
Statute, a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enacted in the first session
of the U.S. Congress.46 Both cases contemplated ongoing challenges
with conceptualizing corporations, and reflect how, from time to time,
the Court displays awareness that its rulings and reasoning do not fit or
fully capture the nature of modern corporations or that the law has tilted
in their favor without meaningful justification. Concurring and dissenting opinions in Ford and Nestlé notably did so, and yet still failed to put
the Court on a different path. They followed years of cases which have
trended, albeit not in absolute fashion, toward limiting corporate responsibility and access to accountability against corporate defendants.47
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 Nikolas Bowie, The Supreme Court, 2020 Term — Comment: Antidemocracy, 135 HARV. L.
REV. 160, 161, 192 (2021).
42 Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2385 (2021).
43 For discussions that trace the ever-expanding scope of corporate rights in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, including the role of the Roberts Court in that expansion, see Blair & Pollman, supra
note 3, at 1725, 1728; and WINKLER, supra note 3, at xvi. For accounts that place the recent era
into context with the Supreme Court’s Lochner era, see generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1495–1507 (2015); and Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133.
44 For another case from the recent Term that reflects this general trend, see TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021), holding that a credit reporting company’s maintenance of
misleading information about plaintiff-consumers in their credit files did not result in “concrete
harm” for purposes of Article III standing if undisclosed, id. at 2210.
45 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021); see also Stephen E.
Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251–55 (2017) (describing the historical evolution of the personal jurisdiction doctrine and an understanding of its enforcement as “a subcategory
of due process,” id. at 1253).
46 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1935, 1937; see also Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789)
(including the ATS as originally enacted); Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
47 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (allowing exemption
from the Fair Labor Standards Act by declining to apply Chevron deference in light of industry
reliance on prior policy); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding that the EPA
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The discussion next turns to a more in-depth look at three of these
examples — Americans for Prosperity, Ford, and Nestlé — as the recent
Supreme Court Term provides a microcosm of the general trend
identified in this Part. Arising under widely different areas of law, each
is offered in the spirit of a case study to explore in more detail how the
Court’s understanding of corporations can translate into expansions of
rights and contractions of responsibilities.
A. Corporations as Rights-Bearing Legal Persons
The first example, Americans for Prosperity, comes from the world
of nonprofit corporations and charitable organizations. Specifically, the
case raised the issue of whether California’s requirement that nonprofit
organizations disclose information about their major donors to the state
authorities violated the First Amendment right to free association.48
The purpose of the required disclosures — Schedule B to Internal
Revenue Service Form 990, including a list of major donors — was to
facilitate the state Attorney General’s ability to police against charitable
fraud and misconduct.49 Although the state Attorney General’s registry
inadvertently provided public access to confidential Schedule Bs at one
point several years ago, since that time the state codified a policy prohibiting such public disclosure and imposed security measures to protect
the filings.50
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
unreasonably disregarded cost when deciding to put emissions limits on coal and oil power plants
following lengthy regulatory process); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013)
(limiting ability to bring collective action claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Am. Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013) (enforcing contractual waiver of class arbitration); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 609 (2011) (holding that federal drug regulations
preempt state tort law claims against generic-drug manufacturers for inadequate warning labels);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (denying a class action certification of over
a million female employees for lacking commonality in gender-pay discrimination claims); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (holding the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state rule regarding unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts);
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2010) (enforcing arbitration provision
against employee who challenged validity of contract as unconscionable); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (restricting plaintiffs from using class arbitration
where clause is silent on the issue of class treatment); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247,
251 (2009) (enforcing collective bargaining agreement to require union members to arbitrate age
discrimination claims); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007)
(narrowly construing the EEOC charging period for plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim),
overturned due to legislative action by Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
48 Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2379. For a discussion of managerial misconduct and
governance failures in nonprofit organizations and the role of state attorneys general, see Peter Molk
& D. Daniel Sokol, The Challenges of Nonprofit Governance, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1497, 1499–1503,
1522–25 (2021).
49 Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2380, 2385–86.
50 See id. at 2381–82.
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The litigants bringing the challenge were two organizations that
might be characterized as ideologically or religiously oriented affinity
groups: the Americans for Prosperity Foundation, described by the
Court as a “public charity” with a stated mission of “education and
training about the principles of a free and open society, including free
markets, civil liberties, immigration reform, and constitutionally limited
government,”51 and the Thomas More Law Center, described by the
Court as a “public interest law firm,” with a stated “mission . . . to
protect religious freedom, free speech, family values, and the sanctity of
human life.”52
Two aspects of the case are particularly noteworthy as they speak to
the Roberts Court’s approach to corporate rights. First, the Court’s
6–3 ruling found facially unconstitutional the disclosure requirement
with little inquiry into whether most of the nonprofit organizations to
which it applied would have any associational interests burdened.53
This approach, without sensitivity to the specifics of entities and the
interests of the people involved in them, can lead to granting overbroad
corporate rights. A similar dynamic was at play in Citizens United,
when the Court granted First Amendment political spending rights to
all corporations instead of simply the nonprofit political advocacy corporation that was before it as a litigant.54 This pattern reflects how the
Roberts Court tends to either characterize corporations with ill-fitting
descriptions or avoid examining them altogether to elide how broadly it
is ruling.
To elaborate further on this point, the litigant organizations — the
Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law
Center — might indeed be composed of individual donors who understand that their affiliation expresses values they hold and exercise
through association, and who have privacy interests at stake that can be
represented by the entities.55 In that way, although vastly differing in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
51

251)).

Id. at 2380 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 10, Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (No. 19-

52 Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioner Thomas More Law Center at 10, Ams. for Prosperity, 141
S. Ct. 2373 (No. 19-255)).
53 Id. at 2386.
54 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 3, at 1734. For a discussion of various ways the Court could
have reached a narrower decision in Citizens United, see Michael W. McConnell, Essay,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 415–16 (2013).
55 See James D. Nelson, Essay, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461,
495 (2015) (observing that “[b]y looking at the dominant pattern of individual attachment to
different kinds of associations, we can begin to make distinctions among them” and that some associations are “genuine communities that are constitutive of their members’ identities”); see also
Nelson, Facts and Values in Corporate Legal Theory, supra note 13, at 255–56 (discussing how a
realist approach to corporate rights might “help disaggregate the organizational world,” id. at 255,
as “there are myriad ways in which real-world differences among vastly different kinds of
organizations might matter for rights analysis,” id. at 256).
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aims and burdens, the organizations could perhaps be likened, as the
Court did, to the NAACP, a civil rights group pursuing racial justice
through its organization as a membership corporation.56
However, in the landmark 1958 freedom of association decision,
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,57 the Court invalidated only a
targeted production order requiring that the NAACP disclose its
membership list to the state.58 Further, the NAACP specifically showed
that it was associational in nature, it brought together members with
common beliefs, and the individuals represented by the organization
faced the severe threat of violent reprisals if their names and addresses
were disclosed pursuant to the production order.59
By contrast, in Americans for Prosperity, the Court broadly invalidated the state regulation as to all nonprofit organizations —
approximately 100,000 registered in California — and did little to examine the interests, associational dynamics, or evidence of threats or
chilling effects on any other organizations besides the two litigants.60
Many of the 100,000 nonprofit organizations registered in California
might have few if any individual donors making contributions large
enough to be listed on a Schedule B, nor organizational aims and dynamics that would give rise to a concern about causing serious harm to
donors or chilling their association.61 Over strong dissent by Justice
Sotomayor on this point, which was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan,62 the Court cited only evidence from the two litigants and cursorily
noted briefs filed in support by amici curiae organizations that also
wished to avoid disclosing donor information to the state.63 In sum, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 See Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2382 (noting that NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), involved the chilling effect of compelled disclosure of affiliation “in its starkest
form”).
57 357 U.S. 449.
58 See id. at 459–63 (“To require that [the right to associational privacy] be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.” Id.
at 459.).
59 See id. at 462–63, 466 (“We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists
which the Association claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members
to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as
to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 466.).
60 See Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2380, 2389; cf. id. at 2391 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that while the majority stated that the regulation was
“facially unconstitutional,” the relief provided was specific to the petitioners).
61 The Court rejected this line of inquiry. See id. at 2388 (majority opinion) (“It is irrelevant,
moreover, that some donors might not mind — or might even prefer — the disclosure of their identities to the State.”).
62 See id. at 2402–04 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has decided, in a radical departure
from precedent, that there no longer need be any evidence that a disclosure requirement is likely to
cause an objective burden on First Amendment rights before it can be struck down.” Id. at 2404.).
63 See id. at 2381, 2388 (majority opinion) (discussing petitioners’ claims that supporters had
been subject to threats and protests).
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majority opinion takes an expansive approach to assuming privacy and
associational interests for a wide array of organizations that it does not
investigate — broadly enforcing rights with little regard for determining
whether the facts on the ground showed them to be in danger.64
Second, the Court arrived at its ruling by applying a narrow tailoring
requirement to the standard of “exacting scrutiny”65 — a move that
could have broad implications for a variety of disclosure regulations,
including for business corporations.66 Instead of focusing on deeper
analysis of the organizations and the significance of their burdens, the
Court justified invalidating the law on a facial challenge because of its
view of the regulation — that the state’s investigative goals were merely
for “administrative convenience” and not narrowly tailored.67 A
majority of the Court joined in applying this standard and reaching this
conclusion, though Chief Justice Roberts did not sway enough of his
colleagues to also join in his one-size-fits-all vision that, “[r]egardless of
the type of association, compelled disclosure requirements [should be]
reviewed under exacting scrutiny.”68 In separate concurrences, however,
Justices Thomas and Alito (joined by Justice Gorsuch) set out their
views for either applying an even higher level of scrutiny or leaving open
the question of a uniform standard for cases involving a First
Amendment challenge to compelled disclosure.69
Altogether, the decision avoids investigating the associational
dynamics and interests of thousands of nonprofit organizations, ratchets
up scrutiny to strike down the state’s disclosure regulation, and suggests
that future challenges to compelled disclosure might receive the same or
even greater levels of scrutiny. As cases involving the rights of nonprofit
corporations and charitable entities have been harbingers for business
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64 See id. at 2388 (“The deterrent effect feared by these organizations is real and pervasive, even
if their concerns are not shared by every single charity operating or raising funds in California.”);
cf. id. at 2402–04 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “research shows that the vast majority of
donors prefer to publicize their charitable contributions,” id. at 2403, and many nonprofit organizations, such as “hospitals and clinics; educational institutions; . . . museums and art
[organizations]; food banks and other organizations providing services to the needy, the elderly, and
the disabled; animal shelters; and organizations that help maintain parks and gardens,” are engaged
in “uncontroversial pursuits,” id.).
65 Id. at 2383 (majority opinion) (“While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly
tailored to the government’s asserted interest.”).
66 See infra section II.A, p. 247–254.
67 See Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2387 (noting a facial challenge is appropriate to
invalidate a law “if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation
to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” and in the case at hand, “[t]he lack of tailoring to the
State’s investigative goals is categorical — present in every case — as is the weakness of the State’s
interest in administrative convenience” (citation omitted)).
68 Id. at 2383 (plurality opinion).
69 See id. at 2390 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2392
(Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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corporations,70 Americans for Prosperity is an important example of the
Roberts Court’s trend of expanding corporate rights with an approach
insensitive to many of their realities.
B. Corporations and Procedural Rules of the Game
Turning now from expanding rights on one side of the “pro-business”
trend identified in this Part to limiting accountability on the other, consider two other cases from the recent Term: Ford and Nestlé. Starting
with the first, Ford illustrates how procedural rules are infused with
conceptions of corporations and have often been tipped in their favor.
It is the latest in a long line of personal jurisdiction cases involving corporate defendants that dates back to International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.71 The history before and after this 1945 case is a cat-andmouse tale of courts taking rules made for individuals, roughly adapting
them to corporations, and then acceding to corporate claims to whittle
them down over time.
Before International Shoe, courts interpreted theories of consent,
doing business, and presence in a state to give “relatively unlimited
jurisdiction over corporate and individual defendants having certain
commercial ties with the forum.”72 Gradually, however, corporations
engaged in crafty tactics to get around these rules, and courts began to
embrace a more limited and dispute-specific approach to jurisdiction,
often leaving injured parties without a convenient forum for their
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70 For example, one of the earliest corporate rights cases involved a nonprofit educational institution, and the Supreme Court subsequently applied its ruling to business corporations. See Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 519–21 (1819) (recognizing Contract Clause
protection for corporations in a case involving a nonprofit college); see also, e.g., Providence Bank
v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 518, 545, 560 (1830) (applying the Dartmouth College ruling on
Contract Clause protection to a bank corporation). Likewise, in the twentieth century, the Court
protected the associational and speech rights of the NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation,
during the Civil Rights era, and later cited these rulings to support extending First Amendment
speech rights to newspaper corporations and then to business corporations more generally in the
context of political spending. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (holding the NAACP’s
activities of associating to assist persons seeking legal redress were protected by First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to speech and association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that the state’s production order of NAACP membership list
violated freedom of association rights); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
780 n.16 (1978) (citing NAACP cases in reasoning to support granting business corporations First
Amendment protection against a state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures
related to state ballot initiatives); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (citing Button
in reasoning to support extending First Amendment protection to a newspaper
corporation).
71 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
72 Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 620–22 (1988)
(explaining that pre–International Shoe, courts deemed corporations present in states to which they
sent products or agents, or in which they had registered to do business or designated an agent for
service of process); see Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1036–37 (2021)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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claims.73 In International Shoe, the Court charted a new course: it held
that due process requires only that a corporate defendant have
“minimum contacts” with the forum state such that “the maintenance of
the suit”74 is “reasonable, in the context of our federal system,”75 and
does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”76 Further, the Court noted that “continuous corporate operations within a state [could be] so substantial and of such a nature [so] as
to justify suit against [the corporation] on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”77 Subsequently, by the
mid–twentieth century, a framework recognizing two types of personal
jurisdiction emerged: general and specific jurisdiction.78
Recent years have once again given a “massive gift to corporate
defendants,”79 however — a string of Supreme Court cases that contracted both types of personal jurisdiction.80 Most notably, using flawed
analogies to individual humans, the Court has dispensed with the notion
that general jurisdiction subjects corporations to jurisdiction in all states
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73 See Twitchell, supra note 72, at 622–23; Robert H. Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5
N.Y. L. REV. 435, 436 (1927).
74 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
75 Id. at 317.
76 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 Id. at 318.
78 Twitchell, supra note 72, at 626–27 (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1966)); see also
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (referencing the framework of general and specific
jurisdiction). General jurisdiction is “all-purpose” and extends to “any and all claims” brought
against a defendant, whereas specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliatio[n] between the forum
and the underlying controversy.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 Todd David Peterson, Categorical Confusion in Personal Jurisdiction Law, 76 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 655, 767 (2019); see also Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV.
1081, 1092–93 (2015) (discussing how the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases “exclude a significant amount of transnational litigation arising from foreign conduct by foreign [corporate]
defendants,” id. at 1092); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Cassandra Burke Robertson & Linda Sandstrom Simard, Ford’s Jurisdictional Crossroads, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 102, 102 (2020) (“In six
personal jurisdiction decisions over the last nine years, the Roberts Court upended several
previously accepted jurisdictional norms.”).
80 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (holding that general jurisdiction exists where a corporation is
“at home,” which, subject to special exception, consists of its state of incorporation and principal
place of business); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877–78 (2011) (insulating
foreign manufacturers that use American distributors from products liability claims); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (denying jurisdiction in U.S. court for a claim brought by
foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants based on events outside the United States); Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (tightening the jurisdictional focus to the defendant’s conduct in the
forum); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017) (rejecting state court’s finding of
jurisdiction where “out-of-state” corporation had thousands of miles of railroad track and thousands
of workers in state but injuries occurred elsewhere); Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137
S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (rejecting the relevance of defendant’s forum contacts unrelated to the
dispute for specific jurisdiction).
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in which they do “continuous and systematic” business.81 Envisioning
a natural person’s “domicile” as the “paradigm forum,” the Court interpreted “an equivalent place” or “home” for corporations as the state of
incorporation and principal place of business.82 General jurisdiction
exists, essentially, in just one or two states for most U.S. corporations.83
Further, specific jurisdiction evolved to cover a “narrower class of
claims,”84 in which the corporate defendant “purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State”85 and the
plaintiff’s claims “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts”
with the forum.86
Seizing on this line of favorable precedent, Ford took an aggressive
stance in response to suits brought against it in Montana and Minnesota
for accidents in those states involving its vehicles.87 The multinational
auto manufacturer is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in
Michigan, and advertises, sells, and services its vehicles in the United
States and abroad.88 In the cases before the Court, it claimed that
personal jurisdiction was lacking because general jurisdiction did not
attach and, although there might have been purposeful availment, there
was no causal link between its conduct in Montana and Minnesota and
the plaintiffs’ claims.89 Specifically, Ford asserted that the particular
vehicles involved in the relevant accidents were designed, manufactured, and first sold in states other than Montana and Minnesota — it
was only through resales and relocations that the vehicles had found
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
81 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–24; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 154 (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (noting that the language had been “taught to generations of first-year law
students”).
82 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. For a discussion of the history of treating corporations more
favorably than individuals, unions, and unincorporated business organizations such as partnerships
and LLCs in some jurisdictional matters, see Susan Gilles & Angela Upchurch, Finding a “Home”
for Unincorporated Entities Post-Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 NEV. L.J. 693, 700–10 (2020).
83 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional
case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or
principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation
at home in that State.”).
84 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).
85 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985) (discussing the “purposeful availment” requirement).
86 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.8 (1984)); Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
87 See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023; Brief for Petitioner at 17, 45–46, Ford, 141 S. Ct. 1017
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369) (arguing that the conduct of petitioners that allegedly led to plaintiffs’ claims
could not satisfy the requirements of specific jurisdiction because it did not occur in the forum
state); Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Ford, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-368_m648.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R94S-JGPK].
88 Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022.
89 See id. at 1023.
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their way into those states, and thus by its logic, specific jurisdiction was
improper.90
Reflecting on this history and Ford’s claim, Justice Gorsuch, in his
concurrence, forcefully rejected Ford’s claim and observed the inequity:
“Nearly 80 years removed from International Shoe, it seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name
of the Constitution. Less clear is why.”91 He highlighted the Court’s
failure to modernize its approach to corporations: “[I]t seems almost
quaint in 2021” to “speak of a corporation having one or two ‘homes’”92
when we are “in a world where global conglomerates boast of their many
‘headquarters.’”93 And although in the 1940s “purposeful availment”
might have been “a reasonable new substitute for assessing corporate
‘presence,’” in the twenty-first century with Internet advertising,
e-commerce, platform business models, and global reach, “the old test
no longer seems as reliable a proxy for determining corporate presence
as it once did.”94
Not only is the doctrine out of touch with modern business, Justice
Gorsuch noted, but it treats corporations better than humans —
“individual defendants remain subject to the old ‘tag’ rule, allowing
them to be sued on any claim anywhere they can be found.”95 Indeed,
“[t]he Constitution has always allowed suits against individuals on any
issue in any State where they set foot.”96 Corporations, of course, do not
have a physical body to set foot anywhere except through directors and
agents, but the failure to fairly assess their presence or consent is precisely the point. Justice Gorsuch did not spell out the consequences in
his concurrence, but they are clear: plaintiffs pay the price.97 Those
plaintiffs may be corporations themselves or individuals, who, going
about their everyday lives, are harmed by corporations’ products or services and then might be unable to bring suit in their home state.
What, then, did the Court rule in Ford? It “proceed[ed] as the Court
has done for the last 75 years — applying the standards set out in
International Shoe and its progeny.”98 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kagan acknowledged its recent case law narrowing specific jurisdiction
for corporate defendants and rejected Ford’s attempt to further narrow
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

See id.
Id. at 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id. (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S 604, 610–11 (1990)).
Id. at 1039 n.5.
See Peterson, supra note 79, at 762 (describing how “corporate defendants are taking advantage” of recent personal jurisdiction case law to seek dismissals and how “[t]he greater the
plaintiff’s burden and expense, the lower . . . the [expected] settlement value of the case”).
98 Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 n.2.
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the rule to include a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s
in-state activity and the plaintiff’s claim.99 From there, the Court
affirmed the decisions below by applying its statement from 1980 in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson100 that if a car manufacturer
“serves a market for a product in the forum State and the product
malfunctions there,” it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in that
state.101
This time, Ford lost. But the bigger picture is the trend line of
decisions incrementally tilting in favor of corporate defendants, leading
to Ford — one of the largest U.S. corporations, which sells millions of
vehicles across all fifty states — claiming that it could not be sued for
products liability in Montana or Minnesota. The shortcomings of
personal jurisdiction doctrine to capture modern business and the
inequity in treatment between individuals and corporate defendants
were brought to light, but the status quo remained. The Court quite
reasonably noted that the facts did not distinctively raise the issues discussed in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence102 — but, of course, it granted
certiorari in Ford in the first instance and not in another case that might
have done so. It remains to be seen if the pendulum favoring corporatate
defendants has started to swing back, or if Ford simply signals that the
Court will not go further than its already accommodating approach.
C. Corporations and External Laws
Finally, Nestlé provides another window into how the Court’s
jurisprudence conceptualizes corporations and can limit access to justice
against corporate defendants or otherwise narrow sources of liability. It
represents the third major ATS case of the Roberts Court era to assail
the hopes of victims of human rights abuses to have their claims heard
in U.S. courts.103
A brief examination of the ATS helps shed light on this path. The
First Congress enacted the ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to provide
a federal forum for foreigners to bring tort suits against violators of the
“law of nations.”104 Scholars have explained that, at that time, “every
nation had a duty to redress certain violations of the law of nations
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
99
100
101
102
103

See id. at 1026–27.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
See id. at 1025 n.2.
See Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937; Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013).
104 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004); id. at 717–19 (discussing adoption of
the ATS); see also William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response
to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222 (1996) (discussing the limited
legislative history of the ATS).
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committed by its citizens or subjects against other nations or their citizens.”105 If a nation did not provide a forum to pursue a remedy, it
became responsible and gave “just cause for war”106 — an outcome to
be avoided. Therefore, with the passage of the ATS, “the First Congress
enabled the United States to remedy an important category of law of
nations violations committed by U.S. citizens against aliens.”107
Invocation of the statute was rare until the 1980s.108 With evolving
recognition that certain atrocities and abuses violated international
norms, courts began to hear ATS actions based on modern human rights
harms.109 Debate ensued over the meaning of the ATS and its scope.110
Federal courts took different approaches to ATS cases, and the fact
patterns were wide-ranging.111 By the late 1990s, human rights advocates began to bring suits against corporations for being complicit in
human rights abuses in violation of international law.112
The first modern ATS case to reach the Court, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,113 came in 2004, just before the Roberts Court era
began.114 It involved an international dispute that arose out of a drug
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
105 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 448 (2011); see id. at 450 (“Although the practice has been largely forgotten
today, a nation became responsible under the law of nations for injuries that its citizens inflicted on
aliens if it failed to provide an adequate means of redress — by punishing the wrongdoer criminally,
extraditing the offender to the aggrieved nation, or imposing civil liability.”).
106 Id. at 448–49.
107 Id. at 449; see also id. at 454 (“In 1789, the most natural way to read the ATS, given its full
legal and historical context, was as a grant of jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear common
law tort claims by aliens against United States citizens for intentional injuries to person or
property.”).
108 See id. at 458–59 (noting “the only significant invocation of the statute,” id. at 458, before the
1980s occurred in Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607)); see also Jesner, 138 S.
Ct. at 1397 (“Over the first 190 years or so after its enactment, the ATS was invoked but a few
times.”).
109 See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398 (describing the history of ATS litigation).
110 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 105, at 461.
111 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a U.S.
district court had jurisdiction under the ATS to hear claims of Ethiopian citizens arising from
allegations of torture in Ethiopia); In re Est. of Marcos, Hum. Rts. Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1467 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding that a U.S. district court had jurisdiction under the ATS to hear claims of families
of alleged victims of torture, execution, and disappearance against the former President of the
Philippines); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775, 798–99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (dismissing complaint brought by primarily Israeli citizens against parties allegedly
responsible for an attack in Israel in violation of the law of nations); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing citizens of Paraguay to sue another Paraguayan citizen for
“deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority”).
112 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also ERIKA
GEORGE, INCORPORATING RIGHTS: STRATEGIES TO ADVANCE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 55–58 (2021) (discussing the history of ATS litigation involving corporate
defendants).
113 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
114 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 105, at 458.
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cartel–related incident involving the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
and a Mexican national.115 Reviewing the history of the ATS, the
Supreme Court determined that it is a jurisdictional statute, and claims
should “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms,”116 such as interfering with the rights of
ambassadors, violating safe conducts, and piracy.117 Any such norm
must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”118 If that threshold is met,
a court should also consider whether allowing the case to proceed is an
appropriate exercise of judicial discretion, particularly in light of the
potential for foreign policy consequences.119 Applying this understanding, the Court concluded that the case before it failed,120 but it rejected
the notion “that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any
international norm intended to protect individuals.”121 Instead, it
concluded “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus
open to a narrow class of international norms today.”122
To date, however, following Sosa, three ATS suits have gone before
the Roberts Court, each involving corporate defendants, and each time
the Court has pushed the door closer to shut. First, in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.,123 the Court rejected a suit against two foreign
corporations accused of aiding and abetting atrocities committed by the
Nigerian government, holding that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS.124 According to the complaint,
“after concerned residents in Ogoniland began protesting the environmental effects” of a joint subsidiary of two large oil and gas companies,
the
corporate
defendants
“enlisted
the
Nigerian
Government to violently suppress the burgeoning demonstrations.”125
For years after, the “Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni
villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying
or looting property,” while the companies allegedly provided the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115
116
117

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–99.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 724–25. This focus on Blackstone’s identification of “principal” offenses left out another, broader category, which would have been understood at the time of passage of the ATS:
intentional torts against the citizens of another nation. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 105, at 448,
454.
118 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748 (quoting In re Est. of Marcos, Hum. Rts. Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
119 See id. at 727–28.
120 See id. at 733–38.
121 Id. at 730.
122 Id. at 729.
123 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
124 See id. at 116–17, 121, 124.
125 Id. at 113.
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Nigerian forces with resources and staging ground for the attacks.126
The plaintiffs, victims of these abuses, were granted political asylum in
the United States and brought suit under the ATS.127 Although the
defendant corporations were traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and had a New York office through an affiliate company, the Court held
that the suit could not be maintained because the relevant conduct
occurred overseas and did not “touch and concern the territory of the
United States.”128 In a concurrence, Justice Breyer pointed out a
weakness in the majority’s reasoning — applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality did not properly account for piracy, which has
long been understood as “fair game ‘wherever found.’”129 As Justice
Breyer noted, this is why the Court had previously left the door open to
ATS claims and prompted judges to ask, “[W]ho are today’s pirates?”130
Next, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,131 the Court further constricted
the reach of the ATS, holding that foreign corporations are categorically
exempt from suit under the statute.132 The Court ruled in favor of a
Jordanian bank accused of transferring funds through its New York
branch for terrorist groups that committed deadly attacks in the Middle
East.133 In so doing, the Court gave an assortment of reasons for
excluding foreign corporations from suit under the ATS: (1) international
tribunals do not evidence a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
norm134 of imposing liability on “corporations or other artificial entities”;135 (2) separation of powers concerns weigh in favor of deferring to
Congress;136 and (3) if plaintiffs could sue multinational corporate entities, other nations might hale American corporations into their courts
“seeking to impose massive liability for the alleged conduct of their
employees and subsidiaries around the world.”137 In all, the Court
concluded it prudent to exclude foreign corporations from suit under the
ATS and leave it to Congress to say otherwise.138
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
vigorously dissented in Jesner and explained that the text and historical
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126
127
128

Id.
See id.
Id. at 125 (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to
say that mere corporate presence suffices.”); see id. at 139 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 130–31 (noting that the piracy example “typically involve[s] applying our law to acts
taking place within the jurisdiction of another sovereign,” id. at 130).
130 Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
131 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
132 See id. at 1407.
133 See id. at 1393–95.
134 Id. at 1399 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
135 Id. at 1400.
136 See id. at 1403.
137 Id. at 1405.
138 See id. at 1407.
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context of the ATS “requires only that the alleged conduct be specifically
and universally condemned under international law,”139 not the method
The Court had
of enforcement such as corporate liability.140
unnecessarily provided immunity to foreign corporations and
undermined the original purpose of the ATS.141 In some instances under
the Court’s ruling, the “harm will persist unremedied”142 because corporations may have a “profit motive”143 for human rights abuses, and individual employees may be unavailable or unable to compensate
plaintiffs.144 Moreover, suits against individuals “d[o] not impose accountability for the institution-wide disregard for human rights.”145
Citing Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the dissent concluded that
immunizing corporations from human rights liability under the ATS allows “these entities to take advantage of the significant benefits of the
corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights, without having to
shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.”146 As this Part highlights, that trend is indeed the leitmotif of the “pro-business” Roberts
Court.
Against this history, the Court heard Nestlé in the recent Term and
further narrowed access to justice against corporate defendants — this
time U.S. corporations.147 At the root of the case is the fact that the
majority of the world’s cocoa comes from Ghana and Ivory Coast, and
child labor has been pervasive on cocoa farms in these countries, with
over a million children as young as five years old engaged in hazardous
work.148 The low price of cocoa from farms in this region reflects the
economics of using child labor; the vast majority of the cocoa farms are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1420–21.
See id. at 1435.
Id.
Id. at 1437.
See id. at 1435.
Id.
Id. at 1437 (citations omitted).
See Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1935.
See Child Labor in the Production of Cocoa, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/child-forced-labor-trafficking/child-labor-cocoa
[https://perma.cc/8KBB-MYK4] (“Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, together, produce nearly 60% of the
world’s cocoa each year, but latest estimates found 1.56 million children engaged in hazardous work
on cocoa farms in these two countries.”); Vivienne Walt, Big Chocolate’s Child-Labor Problem Is
Still Far from Fixed, FORTUNE (Oct. 19, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/10/19/
chocolate-child-labor-west-africa-cocoa-farms [https://perma.cc/FZH6-4LY2] (“[T]he proportion of
children in Ghana and Ivory Coast between the ages of five and 17 who work on cocoa farms has
increased by a staggering 14 percentage points in the past decade, up from 31% to 45% of children
living in the two countries . . . [and] about 95% of those kids face one or more significant safety
hazards on cocoa farms . . . .”); see also GEORGE, supra note 112, at 41–42 (describing the problem
of child labor in chocolate production and various suits against chocolate companies such as
Hershey and Nestlé).
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tiny enterprises, and many of the farmers themselves earn about one
dollar a day.149 The plaintiffs, originally from Mali, “allege[d] that they
were trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa.”150
They sued Nestlé and Cargill — U.S. corporations that bought cocoa
from farms in Ivory Coast, where plaintiffs claim they were enslaved,
and “provided those farms with technical and financial resources —
such as training, fertilizer, tools, and cash — in exchange for the exclusive right to purchase cocoa.”151 Although the resource distribution and
injuries occurred in Ivory Coast, the plaintiffs argued that the corporate
defendants “made all major operational decisions within the United
States” and “knew or should have known” that the farms were using
enslaved child labor, and thus could be held liable for aiding and abetting child slavery under the ATS.152 By contrast, the corporate
defendants argued that they were immune from suit under the ATS and,
alternatively, it would be an improper extraterritorial application of the
ATS in this case.153
Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Thomas ruled in
favor of the corporate defendants on their latter argument, reasoning
that “[n]early all the conduct [plaintiffs] say aided and abetted forced
labor — providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas
farms — occurred in Ivory Coast” and only “allegations of general
corporate activity — like decisionmaking” occurred in the United
States.154 The tight, matter-of-fact language dispensed with “generic
allegations” of decisionmaking as “general corporate activity” that is
“common to most corporations” and plainly insufficient for alleging a
domestic application of the ATS.155
This conception of corporate activity is quite perplexing, however.
A fundamental tenet of corporate law is that the board of directors is
vested with authority to manage the affairs of the corporation.156 It acts
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 See Walt, supra note 148 (describing economics of West African cocoa farms);
SANTADARSHAN SADHU ET AL., NORC FINAL REPORT: ASSESSING PROGRESS IN
REDUCING CHILD LABOR IN COCOA PRODUCTION IN COCOA GROWING AREAS OF CÔTE
D’IVOIRE
AND
GHANA
9
(2020),
https://www.norc.org/PDFs/Cocoa%20Report/
NORC%202020%20Cocoa%20Report_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5MR-UUBS]
(noting
a relationship between the price of cocoa and hazardous child labor).
150 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1935. The case involved Nestlé USA, Inc. (Nestlé), a subsidiary of the
Swiss multinational Nestlé S.A.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Nestlé Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 5–6. For a discussion of the procedural history of
the case, see Recent Case, Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 929 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019), 133 HARV. L. REV.
2643 (2020).
154 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
155 See id.
156 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2021).
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as a collective body through decisionmaking.157 The board of directors
may properly meet in person or convene via technological means,
whether inside or outside of its state of incorporation — the location of
such a board meeting makes no difference as a matter of corporate law;
what is important is that there is a decision of the corporation.158 All
other decisions and operations flow from the board’s authority by
delegation — from the board to the CEO and then all the way down to
the employee or agent at the lowest rung.159 Therefore, to look at the
lowest rung of corporate activity — agents on the ground — and dismiss
the decisionmaking at the top as insignificant turns the ordinary
understanding of corporate activity on its head.160 Although tools and
cash might have a tangible presence in a location, that does not make
the decisionmaking that got them there any less important. Nor is there
difficulty in attributing the decisionmaking of a U.S. corporation to the
United States. And decisionmaking can provide assistance that constitutes aiding and abetting in various contexts.161 Boards also have oversight duties to monitor their organizations for legal compliance — an
obligation with significant complexity for multinational corporations
that are coming under increasing scrutiny by regulators, shareholders,
and other stakeholders around the world.162 As section II.B explores in
more detail, the Court’s reasoning thus fundamentally misconstrues or
understates the significance of the corporate decisionmaking structure
that is integral to the corporate entity and one of its defining features.
Further, generic allegations of corporate decisionmaking might understandably raise pleading concerns, but it is unclear how plaintiffs
who were trafficked and enslaved as children on cocoa farms can be
expected to pinpoint exactly who at the corporation was involved in the
decisionmaking. Tort victims do not have “the tools at hand” that are
available to corporate shareholders, who have the right to request
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157
158
159

See id. § 141(b), (f), (j).
See id. § 141(g), (i).
See id. § 142(a), (b); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.10 (4th ed. 2021) (discussing delegations
by a board of directors); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
160 See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Team Production & the Multinational Enterprise, 38 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 499, 507 (2015) (“[T]he existence of a corporate board at multiple tiers of the organization
does not diminish the role of corporate boards at the headquarters or ultimate parent level in
shaping strategy and decisionmaking, nor does it ignore the importance of hierarchical control
within [multinational enterprises].”).
161 See, e.g., Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135
(2006). And, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out at oral argument, there is evidence that aiding and
abetting was conduct contemplated to fit within the ATS as “those who provided assistance to
pirates were themselves held liable, whether they committed it on land or the sea, as aiders and
abetters.” Nestlé Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 16–17.
162 See infra sections II.B–II.C, pp. 254–261.
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corporate books and records to investigate corporate wrongdoing before
filing suit.163 The circumstances might allow for inference, given the
well-known pervasiveness of child labor on cocoa farms in Ivory Coast
and the cocoa prices that reflect this practice — and that is exactly what
the plaintiffs’ complaint highlights.164 From these facts, it would
admittedly be more difficult to infer knowledge or reckless tolerance of
human trafficking and child slavery rather than unforced child labor.
The Court did not attempt to distinguish between human rights abuses,
however — it only made the empty statement that alleging “general
corporate activity — like decisionmaking” is not enough.165 It also did
not specify whether, or what kind of, specific corporate activity might
suffice to establish domestic application of the ATS.166
Moreover, the Court did not rule on the larger question it granted
certiorari to address — Are U.S. corporations immune from liability under the ATS?167 The issue of corporate liability was a central focus of
oral argument, with Justices repeatedly asking variations on Justice
Kagan’s question: “If you could bring a suit against 10 [enslavers], when
[they] form a corporation, why can’t you bring a suit against the corporation?”168 Justice Breyer similarly reimagined the Marbois affair of
1784, in which a French official had been assaulted in Philadelphia, as
being done by a corporation instead of an individual and asked: “Why
should that make a difference?”169
Justice Alito, alone, dissented on this ground.170 He explained: “I
would decide that question, and . . . I would hold that if a particular
claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a
United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic
corporation.”171 Quite simply, “[c]orporate status does not justify special
immunity.”172 In Justice Alito’s view, the Court had put the cart before
the horse by answering the question of extraterritoriality instead of the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
163 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (providing shareholders with a right to inspect corporate
books and records); George S. Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 71 ALA. L. REV. 407,
420 (2019) (examining shareholders’ “tools at hand” to obtain information (quoting Grimes v.
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218 (Del. 1996))).
164 Complaint at 9–12, Doe v. Nestlé, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV 055133); Brief of Respondents at 3–6, Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (Nos. 19-416 & 19-453).
165 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
166 Id. For example, corporations increasingly face mandatory obligations around the world to
engage in human rights due diligence or voluntarily adopt soft commitments to do so. See infra
sections II.B–II.C, pp. 254–261. Difficult questions might arise about whether detailed allegations
of U.S. corporations engaging in active and ongoing monitoring of human rights abuses in their
supply chain would suffice under the ATS.
167 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (No. 19-416).
168 Nestlé Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 20, 23.
169 Id. at 10–11.
170 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1950 (Alito, J., dissenting).
171 Id.
172 Id.
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threshold issue of corporate liability.173 The through line to Justice
Gorsuch’s Ford concurrence on personal jurisdiction was clear — U.S.
corporations should not be put on special footing.174
And, indeed, Justice Gorsuch concurred in Nestlé with this view as
well: “Nothing in the ATS supplies corporations with special protections
against suit.”175 Neither the statutory text nor original understanding
As Justice Gorsuch
suggests that corporations are exempt.176
highlighted, the text refers to who may sue (“alien[s]”), and the types of
claims (“tort[s]” in “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States”), but “nowhere does it suggest that anything depends on
whether the defendant happens to be a person or a corporation.”177 At
the time of the passage of the ATS, corporations could be sued as defendants at common law,178 the purpose of the ATS was to provide
judicial recourse, and one of the earliest ATS cases involved an in rem
action against a ship involved in piracy.179
In a separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices
Breyer and Kagan, also argued that U.S. corporations should not be
immune from liability180 — which added up to five Justices holding that
view, and a mystery why Nestlé did not reach this holding.181 Instead,
after reaching critical mass on the issue of extraterritoriality, the bulk of
the remaining concurrences fought about the scope of actionable torts
under the ATS and attempts to further erode the pre–Roberts Court case
of Sosa.182 No clarity emerged on the cognizability of secondary liability
such as complicity or aiding and abetting liability.183
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id.
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1034–39 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
175 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1941 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 463
(1765)).
179 Id. at 1941–42. For a discussion of in rem actions against ships involved in the slave trade
and piracy, see Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 15, Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (Nos. 19-416 & 19-453).
180 Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1947 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor explained: “For
reasons similar to those articulated in my dissent in Jesner . . . , I would answer this question [of
corporate immunity under the ATS] in the negative. (So would four other Justices.)” Id. Further:
“As Justice Gorsuch ably explains, there is no reason to insulate domestic corporations from liability
for law-of-nations violations simply because they are legal rather than natural persons.” Id.
181 Justices Gorsuch and Alito did not reconcile their positions in Nestlé with Jesner regarding a
“norm of corporate liability” under international law. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386,
1401 (2018).
182 See Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1937; id. at 1942–43 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1944 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
183 See Beth Van Schaack, Nestlé & Cargill v. Doe: What’s Not in the Supreme Court’s Opinions,
JUST SEC. (June 30, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77120/nestle-cargill-v-doe-whats-not-inthe-supreme-courts-opinions [https://perma.cc/28QG-56EY].
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In sum, instead of making clear that domestic corporations can be
defendants and keeping the “engine of international human rights
protection” alive in Nestlé,184 the Court narrowed the path to liability
through its self-admittedly “convoluted” parsing of the location of
corporate conduct185 and reasoning untethered to the legal and practical
realities of how multinational corporations operate. A more nuanced
treatment of the roles and duties of corporate boards and officers might
have set the Court on a different path, but it instead overlooked their
significance and continued to embrace an approach that limits the places
that a corporation can be held to account for the consequences of its
decisions. Battles ensued through concurrences about just how
narrowly to construe actionable torts for any case going forward, after
a series of cases that had already adopted an unnecessarily cramped
understanding of the statute, even from an originalist standpoint.186
This is how corporate accountability shrinks or disappears.
* * *
As this Part has argued, one of the most notable trends of the Roberts
Court era to date is expanding corporate rights and narrowing liability
or access to justice against corporate defendants. The recent Term is a
microcosm of this trend: Americans for Prosperity displays the Court’s
tendency toward broad rulings for rights without regard to relational
facts and dynamics of organizations. Ford reflects how flawed analogies
and a failure to reimagine longstanding principles have bent the law
over time toward favorable procedural rules for corporations and
emboldened corporate defendants in their claims. Nestlé reveals the
Court’s willingness to disregard the reality of multinational corporations
and their decisionmaking structures and supply chains. And, although
principles of fairness and accountability motivate underlying doctrines
in areas such as personal jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute, the
Court often seems to come to decisions that do not fully resonate with
these values. They leave readers with colorful questions: Why are
corporations deemed “at home” in only one or two states? Who are
today’s pirates? But more importantly, they raise a broader concern:
Why are corporations treated more favorably than individuals? Particularly as this concern is expressed in concurrences and dissents by
Justices across a spectrum of viewpoints and with different judicial philosophies, it suggests that the “pro-business” label captures something
notable about the Court’s orientation or outcomes as a general trend.
Yet, as the next Part argues, it is also too simple as a description of the
larger dynamic.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Nestlé Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 25.
Nestlé, 141 S. Ct. at 1943 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See supra note 117.

2021]

THE SUPREME COURT

-

COMMENTS

247

II. THE PRO-BUSINESS PARADOX
The discussion so far has focused on the Supreme Court’s treatment
of corporations regarding “external” rules and regulations. This Part
now shifts to the related “internal” world of business. Doing so highlights something remarkable: many of the Court’s rulings seen as
pro-business are actually at odds with corporate law or catalyze
countervailing activity in corporate governance. In many ways, the
Roberts Court has moved in the opposite direction as current corporate
debates and activity — the world that is inhabited by investors, directors, executives, other business industry insiders, as well as stakeholders.
This Part investigates this relationship between the internal and external realms and the impact of the Court’s jurisprudence on corporations. It does so in four interrelated sections. First, the discussion examines how expanding corporate rights can trigger internal battles and
imperil key governance mechanisms such as disclosure. Next, the discussion explores how the Court’s jurisprudence is not only in tension
with corporate law and governance on the topic of rights, but also on
core issues of accountability for board decisionmaking and oversight.
Bringing these threads together leads to the larger observation that increasing rights and weakening external accountability more broadly undermines basic assumptions of corporate law.
The Court’s
“pro-business” jurisprudence contributes to a dynamic that ultimately
increases pressure on internal law and governance to create stronger
constraints and processes to sort the various interests of its participants
and stakeholders, as evidenced by growing calls for reform and the
rising ESG movement. These efforts to shape corporate activity through
the internal realms may create benefits, but might also be costly for
corporations and their participants, as well as limited in their overall
effects, and potentially hindered by the Court’s robust conceptions of
corporate rights. Finally, the discussion concludes by observing that the
“pro-business” Court may not actually serve the interests of many
shareholders and stakeholders when it tilts toward corporate power and
narrows responsibility.
A. Corporate Rights, Governance Battles, and Regulatory Pressures
Some Supreme Court decisions directly catalyze an internal reaction
in corporations. Most notably, when the Court expands corporate rights,
an impact on the corporation may be “inevitable.”187 With expanded
rights comes a need to decide whether and how to use them. A
“pro-business” ruling can thus, paradoxically, spur a corporate battle as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
187 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Comment:
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) (“As long as corporations are permitted to engage in political speech, we show, decisional rules governing whether and
how they decide to do so are inevitable.”).
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participants attempt to rein in corporate activity. Further, the Court’s
expansion of rights can influence new regulation or bolster challenges
seeking to dismantle existing regulation that applies to corporations.
Each of these situations has the potential to create significant tensions
in corporate law and governance, as we can see from Citizens United,
earlier in the Roberts Court era, to Americans for Prosperity, from the
recent Term.188
For over a decade since the Court opened the door to corporate independent political expenditures in Citizens United, shareholders in
large corporations have fought to restrain this spending and receive
disclosures for greater transparency.189 Given the Court’s flawed assumptions and vision of corporations as “associations of citizens” in a
“corporate democracy” with access to information,190 corporate political
spending has become an intractable problem of corporate law and
governance.191 Private ordering occurs, but is unlikely to succeed on a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
188 By contrast, the Roberts Court’s decisions on securities litigation have been “generally
preservative and modest in their effects.” John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts
Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); see also Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme
Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
847, 849–50 (2017) (comparing the Roberts Court on securities fraud and litigation issues to “a museum curator maintaining historical relics from bygone eras,” id. at 850).
189 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, More Shareholders Seek Transparency on Corporate Political
Spending and Climate Change, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 16, 2021), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/more-shareholders-seek-transparency-corporatepolitical-spending-and [https://perma.cc/CKL9-SKJW] (observing that activism around shareholder proposals has been “robust for a decade, especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC greenlit a whole new ability for corporations to spend in politics”); see
Ephrat Livni, On Voting Rights, It Can Cost Companies to Take Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/business/dealbook/voting-rights-companies.htm
[https://perma.cc/PMJ3-6VW9] (reporting that about ten percent of the S&P 500 each year receives
shareholder proposals related to corporate political spending and disclosure, which receive significant support).
190 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354, 361–62, 370 (2010) (assuming
that there is “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy,’” id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978)), and “[w]ith the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable,” id. at 370). Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Citizens United majority opinion, later
acknowledged that his assumption about shareholders’ access to information was “not working the
way it should.” Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term “Swing Vote”, NAT’L L.J.
ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202740827841/Justice-Anthony-Kennedy-Loathes-the-Term [https://perma.cc/WAU6-76PC].
191 Even though many corporations’ political spending may not be “expressive,” attempts to
change corporate law itself to restrict corporate political spending would be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. See Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1, 70–71 (1995) (“If a broader restraint is to be considered — e.g., a proscription of
corporate advocacy speech or a requirement of stockholder consent for such speech — the question
is whether the restraint is sufficiently narrow to be constitutionally tolerable.”); Larry E. Ribstein,
The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2011)
(“[R]egulation specifically restricting speech by for-profit corporations may be considered
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wide scale.192 Shareholder proposals sometimes garner majority
support, but overall the shareholder proposal mechanism is a costly and
inefficient means for achieving widespread change and is subject to
collective action and agency problems given the realities of intermediated and retail investment.193 Some companies have voluntarily
adopted policies regarding corporate political spending and disclosure,
but only a small handful have agreed to stop spending, and many companies have failed to keep their promises or disclose only partial information.194 Shareholders have turned to behind-the-scenes negotiations
for private deals with management on corporate policies — furthering
the lack of transparency and democratic processes in corporations.195 A
petition for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
viewpoint-discriminatory and subject to a higher level of First Amendment scrutiny.”). Reasonable
corporate governance reform that does not unduly restrict speech might pass constitutional scrutiny,
but few attempts to do so have been made. See Ribstein, supra, at 1041–44 (discussing a proposal
for governance regulation after Citizens United).
192 See Rebecca Henderson, Foreword to BRUCE FREED ET AL., CTR. FOR POL.
ACCOUNTABILITY, 2020 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX], http://www.
politicalaccountability.net/cpa-zicklin-index [https://perma.cc/4AY2-BL8G] (“While a few particularly enlightened firms may decide to unilaterally disarm, most firms will continue to devote
resources to political action unless and until it becomes clear that every firm will cease and desist.”).
Other avenues for shareholder action besides proposals are generally nonstarters — selling stock
does not provide an adequate remedy, and derivative lawsuits are unlikely to succeed. Elizabeth
Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech,
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 54–55 (2009) (explaining how selling stock does not provide a remedy
and that other mechanisms such as director elections and derivative lawsuits are generally
ineffective at constraining corporate political spending).
193 Livni, supra note 189 (noting that “[i]nvestors are battling with corporate boards, filing shareholder resolutions that demand more transparency and accountability about political donations,”
and “[i]ncreasingly, they’re winning”); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed
Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 895–96 (1994) (explaining that “shareholder
voting in public corporations requires collective action through the proxy mechanism,” id. at 895,
and so “the chance of an outright voting victory is slim even in the case of value-producing
proposals,” id. at 896, because of “rational shareholder apathy” and “suboptimal production,” id.).
194 2020 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX, supra note 192, at 28 (noting only thirteen companies in the S&P
500 had policies prohibiting political spending other than through employee-funded political action
committees); HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, IRRC INST., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL EXPENDITURES: 2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES 26 (2011) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Out of the 57 companies . . . that have policies
apparently prohibiting political spending, only 23 companies actually did not give money to political
committees, parties or candidates . . . .”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr., James D.
Nelson & Roberto Tallarita, The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 28 (2020) (discussing a report by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
that found “significant discrepancies between the companies’ voluntary disclosure policies and their
actual practices”).
195 See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public
Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 269 (2016) (examining private settlement agreements that corporations negotiate with shareholders through a “process [that] plays out completely behind closed doors,
with no notice to or participation by most shareholders, other stakeholders, or the public,” and with
which “companies have often failed to comply”).
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corporate political spending disclosure has stalled despite a
record-breaking 1.2 million comments.196 Meanwhile, corporate political spending has increased and gone “underground” to intermediaries.197
All of this is so despite many, if not most, shareholders having a
variety of reasons — including business and financial — to prefer restraint in corporate political spending. Corporate political spending presents agency cost problems that are difficult for shareholders to monitor
and eliminate.198 Shareholders do not want corporations they are invested in to engage in political speech they oppose.199 Institutional investors have a “double legitimacy” problem as neither investment funds
nor company management have legitimacy to speak for shareholders.200
Corporate political spending can increase social and political risk, either
at a particular company or more generally across the market if such
spending and perceptions of corruption significantly contribute to
polarization and social instability.201 And, corporate political spending
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
196
197

Bebchuk et al., supra note 194, at 3.
Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 318 (2014).
198 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 194, at 22 (discussing managerial agency costs associated with
corporate political spending); John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before
and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 658 (2012) (finding that “[i]n the
majority of industries . . . political activity . . . correlates negatively with measures of shareholder
power (shareholder concentration and shareholder rights), positively with signs of managerial
agency costs (corporate jet use by CEOs), and negatively with shareholder value”); see also Adam
Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92
GEO. L.J. 871, 876 (2004) (showing “that the containment of agency costs . . . played a formative role
in the regulation of corporate politics”).
199 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 264 (1981) (“To permit corporate funds to be used to influence the
exercise of government power . . . fractures [a shareholder’s] power to influence government decisions on a range of issues — such as environmental or health and safety regulations, taxation, race
relations . . . [and] may impinge upon . . . individual preferences.”). For discussions of the Court’s
asymmetrical treatment of shareholders and union members regarding political spending by corporations and labor unions, see id. at 268–70; and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet:
The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 436, 450–53 (2016) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet].
200 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the
Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1007, 1022–27 (2020).
201 See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV.
1401, 1402 (2020) (concluding based on interviews with “leading public and private companies, large
asset managers, investors and pension funds, shareholder advisory firms, and sustainability standard setters and data providers” that “it was investors who pushed hard for environmental and social
initiatives” and “investors’ support for sustainability is precisely because it helps fight risks that are
otherwise hard to diversify”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 566/2021, 2021) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (arguing
that large diversified funds such as index funds “should seek to mitigate systematic risk, which most
notably would include climate change risk, financial stability risk, and social stability risk”). For
an example of an investor coalition expressing concern that “the erosion of political stability in the
United States . . . poses substantial systemic risk to long-term investors’ portfolios,” and demanding
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might undermine external laws and weaken corporate accountability202 —
which diversified shareholders should not favor. Even many corporate
directors and officers might have preferred to forego corporations having the power of political spending in order to avoid the difficulty of
navigating these decisions and risks in a polarized era.203 And so,
Citizens United not only empowered corporations as political actors, but
also launched a thousand ships in corporate governance and created
problems that cannot easily be solved.
New battles now loom on the horizon. In particular, with rising
interest in corporations’ ESG activity and data, securities regulation
increasingly appears to be on a collision course with the First
Amendment — what corporate and securities law experts frame as a
“disclosure” regulation might become “compelled speech” as a matter of
constitutional scrutiny.204 To date, the Supreme Court has avoided the
question of whether the First Amendment covers speech affected by
securities regulation,205 and for many years observers believed it was
inapplicable,206 but current developments suggest this could be the next
“jurisprudential train wreck”207 for corporate investors and
stakeholders.
Americans for Prosperity intensifies concern that a heightened level
of scrutiny might apply to mandatory ESG disclosure, and thus has the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
corporate political spending reform, see Letter from the Inv. Coal., Majority Action, to Corp. Donors
(June 16, 2021), https://www.majorityaction.us/investor-coalition [https://perma.cc/8LNG-BM93].
202 Pollman, supra note 33, at 687–92; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 199, at 432.
203 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Politics and the Business Corporation, REGUL., Winter 2003–2004, at
30, 35 (explaining that corporate managers embraced the Tillman Act, which prohibited corporate
political contributions).
204 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First
Amendment, 43 KAN. L. REV. 163, 205 (1994) (arguing that “[g]overnance speech shares enough of
the underlying characteristics that supposedly distinguish political from commercial speech that
such speech should be treated either as political speech or as a hybrid between commercial and
political”); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 807–18 (2007) (summarizing debate about whether the First
Amendment applies to securities regulation).
205 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (resolving a challenge to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 with narrow statutory interpretation); see also Page, supra note
204, at 789–90 (“When Congress passed [the 1933 and 1934 securities acts], the First Amendment
was thought to be irrelevant to securities regulation because the Supreme Court had not yet extended First Amendment coverage to government-compelled speech or commercial speech.”).
206 Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 223
(1990) (“The received wisdom for fifty years has been that the [F]irst [A]mendment is inapplicable
to speech relating to the operation of securities markets.”).
207 Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach
to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616–17 (2006) (arguing there is an
“impending jurisprudential train wreck in the realm of securities regulation,” id. at 616, and “the
Supreme Court’s forced divide between commercial speech and corporate political speech is
intellectually unstable,” id. at 617).
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potential to influence the content and structure of the SEC’s rulemaking
on a host of disclosure issues from corporate political spending to climate
risk. Simmering under the surface of the Court’s opinion and various
concurrences in the case was a debate about the standard of
constitutional review for compelled speech under the First Amendment.
This space has increasingly become muddled with gray areas about
when the Court will apply strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, rational basis review — or something in between.208
A majority of the Court in Americans for Prosperity ratcheted up
exacting scrutiny by imposing a narrow tailoring requirement, and in a
splintered portion of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts suggested on
behalf of a three-Justice plurality that this level of scrutiny should
categorically apply to all compelled disclosure requirements,
“[r]egardless of the type of association.”209 He noted that the Court had
applied exacting scrutiny outside of electoral-disclosure regimes, and
that under NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, “‘it is immaterial’ to
the level of scrutiny ‘whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters.’”210
A concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, declined to
decide between exacting and strict scrutiny for a uniform approach to
compelled disclosure, but applauded the majority opinion for giving
“real teeth” to the exacting scrutiny standard.211 None of these discussions in Americans for Prosperity makes clear whether they would
extend a heightened form of scrutiny to securities regulation of business
corporations such as for corporate political spending or other forms of
ESG disclosures, as opposed to the specific context at issue in the case
of nonprofit organizations and freedom of association. The general
tenor of Americans for Prosperity, however, suggested an approach even
more protective of organizations than Citizens United, which had upheld disclosure of corporate political spending.212 Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent in Americans for Prosperity indeed observed: “Today’s analysis
marks reporting and disclosure requirements with a bull’s-eye.”213

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
208 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S 626, 651 (1985) (applying a standard
below the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson to a disclosure requirement of “purely factual
and uncontroversial information” to prevent deception of consumers). For a discussion of “uncertainty” and “confusion” about when the Court will apply one of its “three identifiable versions of
strict scrutiny” or “several varieties of intermediate scrutiny,” see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict
Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1267, 1298–302 (2007).
209 Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021).
210 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958)).
211 Id. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring).
212 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367–71 (2010).
213 Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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In the shadow of this case is a growing ESG movement in which
global and U.S. institutional investors and asset managers are demanding expanded ESG disclosures using a standardized, mandatory reporting framework.214 Trillions of dollars are under management with
sustainability screens and strategies to integrate ESG data into portfolio
selection and management, but the information currently being
produced through voluntary initiatives is limited, suffers from quality
Whether various ESG
problems, and lacks comparability.215
information is “material” or outside of the SEC’s “core mission” has been
the subject of robust debate, while investors and corporate managers
increasingly embrace the potential benefits of ESG strategies for risk
mitigation and long-term value.216
After a change in administration, the SEC requested public comment
on climate change and other areas of potential mandatory ESG
disclosures such as political spending, workforce diversity, and more —
signaling that it intends to act.217 A tidal wave of responses has swiftly
come into the SEC with varying views on content and approach, including a warning from one state attorney general of a plan to file a First
Amendment lawsuit if the SEC adopts ESG disclosure requirements.218
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
214 See Cynthia A. Williams & Donna M. Nagy, ESG and Climate Change Blind Spots: Turning
the Corner on SEC Disclosure, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1453, 1454, 1458 (2021).
215 See id. at 1453, 1458; see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling
Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72
STAN. L. REV. 381, 392–99 (2020) (discussing the evolution of ESG investing); Sustainable Investing
Basics, US SIF, https://www.ussif.org/sribasics [https://perma.cc/KG8Z-6QCV] (discussing ESG
investments).
216 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 925
(2019) (discussing debate about the materiality of ESG and the trend that “issuers are modifying
their operations in response both to investor demands and to the claim that sustainable business
practices lead to improved economic performance”); Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC,
Chocolate-Covered Cicadas, Remarks Before the Brookings Institution (July 20, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-chocolate-covered-cicadas-072021 [https://perma.cc/B265W5TM] (discussing materiality as a guiding principle for securities regulation and arguing that
“[m]any ESG issues lack a clear tie to financial materiality”).
217 Katanga Johnson, U.S. SEC Chair Provides More Detail on New Disclosure Rules, Treasury
Market Reform, REUTERS (June 23, 2021, 1:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/
sustainable-business/sec-considers-disclosure-mandate-range-climate-metrics-2021-06-23 [https://
perma.cc/43Y8-YL39]; Allison Herren Lee, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change
Disclosures, SEC (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-changedisclosures [https://perma.cc/WJS3-XTVM].
218 See Commenters Weigh in on SEC Climate Disclosures Request for Public Input, DAVIS
POLK (July 6, 2021), https://www.davispolk.com/insights/client-update/commenters-weigh-sec-climate-disclosures-request-public-input [https://perma.cc/HRJ4-4LG7] (summarizing comments from
academics, accounting firms, asset managers and investors, trade associations, government officials,
sustainability groups, and technology companies); Letter from Patrick Morrisey, Att’y Gen., State
of West Virginia, to Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, SEC (Mar. 25, 2021), https://ago.wv.gov/
Documents/Letter%20to%20Acting%20Chair%20Lee.pdf [https://perma.cc/836Q-N7TY] (stating
that “First Amendment strict scrutiny is an unmistakable roadblock for your proposal” and “[i]f the
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In combination with a D.C. Circuit decision in 2015 that struck down
the SEC’s conflict minerals disclosure rule on First Amendment
grounds,219 and the Supreme Court’s recent ratcheting up of scrutiny on
compelled speech, the SEC is likely aware that it faces a choice between
exceedingly tightly crafted rulemaking or years of litigation.
This is the crux of the tension — while many investors want
additional disclosures to broadly understand a wide array of environmental, social, and governance activities and risks of corporations, cases
like Americans for Prosperity suggest that government regulation
forcing this disclosure will come under fire. And, all together, from
Citizens United to Americans for Prosperity, the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence could ironically lead to a situation in which the Court has
protected a corporation’s right to engage in political spending based on
a view of it as an “association of citizens,” but allows constitutional
scrutiny to block actual participants in the corporation from getting
information about matters relating to the social and political activity of
the corporation.
B. Accountability for Board Decisionmaking and Oversight
The Court’s approach to corporations emerges not only in its
expanding rights jurisprudence that creates governance tensions and
imperils disclosure obligations, but also in its decisions in other areas of
law that misconceive or ignore key features of corporations and erode
corporate accountability. Nestlé provides an example, with the Court’s
ruling and reasoning diminishing the central corporate activity of board
decisionmaking. More generally, the trend of increasing rights and
tilting external rules and regulation toward corporations undermines
foundational assumptions about the role of corporate law and runs
counter to emerging investor preferences.
Recall the Nestlé majority opinion’s conclusion that “general corporate activity — like decisionmaking” is insufficient for ATS pleadings to
avoid the presumption against extraterritoriality.220 Such phrasing and
understanding is difficult to reconcile with corporate law, which creates
the corporation as a separate legal person and places the board of
directors at the heart of its decisionmaking structure and vests it with
the authority to manage the affairs of the corporation.221 This centralized decisionmaking structure is a “cardinal precept” of corporate law
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Commission proceeds down this pathway, States and other interested stakeholders will not hesitate
to go to court to oppose a federal regulation compelling speech”).
219 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
220 See supra p. 242.
221 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 159, at 552 (observing that U.S. corporations have “a
branching hierarchy headed by a board of directors”); Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood
and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 788 (“The governance structure prescribed
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and the means through which a corporation takes action.222 Further,
board decisionmaking is embedded in a structure for accountability, as
exercise of this power carries with it the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care, which are often expressed as being owed to the corporation and its
shareholders.223
Corporate law has long focused on decisionmaking as a potential
basis for liability, and contemporary doctrine has evolved to encompass
broader oversight obligations. As part of their duty of loyalty, corporate
directors and officers have a duty to act in good faith, which prohibits
decisionmaking with the intent to violate positive law.224 Corporate law
does not limit the scope for legal obedience to domestic laws, nor does
it limit the beneficiaries of legal obedience only to shareholders — thus
the duty of good faith in decisionmaking can have far-ranging
impacts.225 Further, Delaware courts, the most influential purveyors of
corporate law, have also recognized that a failure to make a good faith
effort to put in place and oversee a board-level system of monitoring
and reporting could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty giving rise to
director liability.226 Under the Caremark doctrine, directors can be held
liable if they knew or should have known that violations of law were
occurring in the corporation, and if they failed to take steps in good faith
to prevent or remedy the situation.227 That is, corporate law requires
legal obedience to rules of positive law and further recognizes that
directors can be held liable in certain circumstances for decisionmaking
as well as inaction — such as a failure of oversight regarding legal
compliance.228 These principles of corporate law serve public values by
incorporating legal responsibility, and protect shareholders and the
corporation by prohibiting fiduciaries from knowingly allowing the
corporation to participate in lawbreaking.229
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
by corporate law since the early nineteenth century is a managerial hierarchy topped by a board of
directors that is distinct from shareholders, managers, and employees, and that has fiduciary duties
to the corporation itself as well as to shareholders.”); J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz,
The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 35 (2015) (“Delaware corporate
law embraces a ‘board-centric’ model of governance.”).
222 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also Quadrant Structured Prods. Co.,
Ltd. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 548 (Del. Ch. 2015).
223 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
224 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
225 See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 739–40, 740 n.150 (2019).
226 See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone,
911 A.2d at 368.
227 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
228 See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2018–
25 (2014).
229 See id. at 2016–17, 2026.
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Claims for a breach of the duty of good faith are difficult for
shareholder-plaintiffs to win even in egregious circumstances, but over
time Delaware corporate law has trended toward a more robust conception of the monitoring board and its oversight duties.230 This fits into a
larger trend in which corporate compliance programs have proliferated
and taken on greater importance in corporate practices, including for
global issues such as supply chain risk management, foreign corrupt
practices, and other regulatory regimes.231
Put in this light, the Court’s disregard for the importance of board
decisionmaking and oversight is all the more glaring — large corporations with significant risk for legal violations related to core aspects of
their business model are likely well aware that their decisionmaking or
failure of oversight could expose both the corporation and its fiduciaries
to litigation and liability, particularly if they failed to monitor and respond in good faith to “red flags.”232 Under corporate law the individual
directors’ fiduciary obligations notably run to shareholders for enforcement, not third-party tort victims — but the larger point here is about
conceptualizing corporations and their accountability. If “general
corporate decisionmaking” in the United States is not enough, and financing and training farmers in Ivory Coast is outside of reach, it would
seem the Court has set up a nearly insuperable standard for ATS claims
that does not cohere with general corporate understandings of the
significance of board decisionmaking and oversight responsibility.
Looking ahead, the Court has not fully foreclosed U.S. corporate
liability under the ATS and could still correct course while respecting
the limits of the statute. Congress could act to clarify the ATS or specific
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
230 Recent cases in which plaintiffs’ Caremark claims have survived motions to dismiss in
Delaware courts include: In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No. 2019-0907-MTZ, 2021 WL
4059934, at *25 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021); Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808 (Del. 2019); In re
Clovis Oncology, Inc., Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 1, 2019); and Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27,
2020). For discussions of recent developments in Delaware’s oversight doctrine, see Pollman, supra
note 228, at 2023–25; Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences, 98 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1857, 1863–67 (2021); and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark
and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and
Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1897 n.39 (2021).
231 See, e.g., Harper Ho, supra note 160, at 533; Wim Huisman, Corporations, Human Rights and
Compliance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE 989, 990 (Benjamin van Rooij
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 933, 934 (2017); Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in Information Governance, 23 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 179, 249–56 (2020).
232 See Peter Whoriskey, Supreme Court Weighs Child-Slavery Case Against Nestlé USA, Cargill,
WASH. POST (Dec. 1. 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/01/cocoasupreme-court-child-labor [https://perma.cc/RQ63-AF7F] (noting that “the world’s chocolate
supply depends heavily on child labor and . . . despite two decades of industry promises, it remains
widespread,” and an investigation “found representatives of some of the biggest and best-known
brands could not guarantee that any of their chocolate was produced without child labor”).
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areas for accountability as it has done in decades past by granting express causes of action for victims of torture and human trafficking.233
Further, Congress could follow the lead of other lawmaking bodies
around the world by mandating corporations to engage in human rights
due diligence.234 But in the absence of these developments, corporations
will likely receive the message that the door that was left open in Sosa
to ATS claims for international human rights abuses has nearly
closed.235 And more broadly, the Court’s lack of attention to corporate
principles could perpetuate flawed reasoning in other areas of law.236
C. Opposite Trends and Changing Dynamics
in the Role of Corporate Law
In addition to the above, the larger trend of increasing rights and
narrowing liability for corporations undermines corporate law principles
in a more fundamental way. Since the early twentieth century, U.S.
corporate law has developed with a focus on shareholders, directors, and
officers, with a view that concerns about stakeholders and the impact of
corporations on society will be primarily addressed by laws external to
corporate law.237 State corporate law does little to take formal account
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233 Id. For a discussion of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 and the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, see generally Anna Williams Shavers, Human Trafficking, the Rule of Law,
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 39, 49–53 (2012).
234 See John F. Sherman, III, Human Rights Due Diligence and Corporate Governance, in A
GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE FOR LAWYERS (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
15–16), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/CRI_WP_79_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6R2-4D2N] (describing mandatory human rights due diligence legislation passed
and pending in several European countries as well as a proposal for an EU-wide directive that
would apply to “non-EU companies that sell goods or services into the EU market,” id. (manuscript
at 15); see also Kishanthi Parella, Improving Human Rights Compliance in Supply Chains, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 731–35 (2019) (arguing that a combination of legal and reputational
mechanisms can incentivize corporations to engage in human rights due diligence and compliance
in global supply chains).
235 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Geoffrey Heal, Are US Corporations Above the Law?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (July 12, 2021), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nestle-cargillchocolate-child-slavery-case-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-and-geoffrey-heal-2021-07
[https://perma.cc/
VTF4-N886] (“[T]he US Supreme Court has sent a dangerous message. Apparently, US corporations will not be held to the same standards of decency and human rights abroad as they are at
home.”); see also William S. Dodge, The Surprisingly Broad Implications of Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe
for Human Rights Litigation and Extraterritoriality, JUST SEC. (June 18, 2021), https://www.
justsecurity.org/77012/the-surprisingly-broad-implications-of-nestle-usa-inc-v-doe-for-humanrights-litigation-and-extraterritoriality [https://perma.cc/WT4Z-4XBR] (observing the “potentially
dramatic implications” of the Court’s approach to extraterritoriality and that cases that fit the
description of “conduct in the United States that goes beyond making decisions about how to conduct operations abroad” are “likely to be few and far between”).
236 For example, another notable opinion that fails to account for the separate legal personality
of the corporation and the board of directors as the key decisionmaking body is Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). See Greenfield & Rubens, supra note 33, at 285.
237 See sources cited supra note 21.
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of participants such as employees, creditors, consumers, or other stakeholders in the governance structure, and assumes that their interests will
be furthered by external regulation and contracts.238 As this Comment’s
discussion has highlighted, the boundaries between the internal and external realms of corporate governance and regulation are far more permeable than this traditional formulation suggests, and some aspects of
corporate and securities laws serve stakeholder interests or leave considerable room for boards, shareholders, and managers to do so239 —
but the basic framing remains.240
When the Supreme Court increases corporate rights, particularly in
the political realm, and narrows accountability through external regulation, it thus weakens the justification for leaving stakeholders without
voice or protection in corporate law and governance.241 Put differently,
corporate law and governance rely on the enforcement of external regulation to constrain corporate activity in the interest of social welfare.242
Jurisprudence that weakens corporate accountability or tilts the rules of
the game in their favor eventually increases pressure on corporate law
and governance to create stronger internal constraints and processes to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
238 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (2002) (arguing that corporate “externalities should be constrained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and other forms of regulation”); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with
Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 951 (2008) (“[S]takeholders of the firm — for example employees, communities, or customers — are left to depend primarily on ‘external’ regulations, such as
minimum-wage laws, environmental regulations, and consumer safety rules.”); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401,
402 (1993) (explaining that under state corporate law doctrine, apart from nonbinding constituency
statutes, “[p]rotection for other sorts of [nonshareholder] claimants [has] existed only to the extent
provided by contract”).
239 Lipton, supra note 21, at 657 (“Corporate discourse often distinguishes between internal and
external regulation . . . [but] most commenters would likely agree that these categories are too
simplistic; relationships between investors and managers are often regulated with a view toward
benefitting other stakeholders.”); Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance
Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11–13, 36–40, 48–52) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (describing discretion afforded to boards to consider stakeholder
interests and incorporation of stakeholder interests into corporate activity through shareholderdriven ESG initiatives).
240 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 179 (2017) (describing corporate law structure
giving shareholders power and boards of directors authority to manage business affairs); see sources
cited supra p. 223 (describing the traditional internal/external dichotomy underpinning corporate
law).
241 See Pollman, supra note 33, at 691; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 199, at 432.
242 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper & James D. Nelson, The Religious Conversion of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 70 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 30–36) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (describing laws that impose obligations on businesses); Leo E. Strine, Jr. &
Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with
Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 918–28 (2016) (tracing the history of corporate law development alongside the enactment of external law that constrained corporate political
spending).
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sort the various interests of its participants and stakeholders. In the
bigger picture, the Court’s jurisprudence is just one thread among many
in the twenty-first century that has contributed to the changing balance
of powers and protections for corporations and their stakeholders,243 but
it is notable nonetheless. And, as one might expect given the tension
identified here, recent years have evidenced this changing landscape
with corresponding calls from scholars and politicians for a rethinking
of corporate law to promote stakeholder interests and increase
democratic values and processes in corporate governance.244
In this environment, other mechanisms besides external regulation,
and short of major corporate law reform, have moved into the spotlight.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has evolved into a mainstream
ESG movement that continues to gain steam.245 Managers and
investors increasingly see ESG initiatives as a means of incorporating
stakeholder interests into corporate activity and mitigating risks and
externalities created by corporations, ultimately promoting the creation
of sustainable, long-term value.246
This trend is moving in the opposite direction as the Court’s jurisprudence and suggests that many investors and other corporate
participants may not want “pro-business” rulings that weaken corporate
incentives to mitigate their externalities.247 Further, the trend is global
and multinational corporations do not escape its reach.248 For example,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
243 For a discussion of changes in “countervailing power,” such as “governmental
regulation . . ., competitive pressure from rival firms, and organized labor,” see Brian R. Cheffins,
Corporate Governance and Countervailing Power, 74 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2019).
244 See, e.g., Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2009, 2014 (2019) (reviewing ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018)); Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller,
Codetermination and the Democratic State, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Yin and Yang of Corporations and Democracy
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 51–54) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); GRANT M.
HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION: FROM
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE 13 (2020); Accountable Capitalism Act,
S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi O. Williams, Lifting
Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American
Corporate Governance, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
245 Lund & Pollman, supra note 239 (manuscript at 35–36) (examining the evolution of CSR to
ESG).
246 Id. (manuscript at 36) (discussing the ESG movement); Mark S. Gerber, U.S. Corporate
Governance: The Ascension of ESG, SKADDEN (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2021/01/2021-insights/corporate/us-corporate-governance
[https://perma.cc/EH3MUUUD]; Ann M. Lipton, ESG Investing, Or, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD, supra note 13, at 130, 131–32.
247 See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Protecting Third Parties in Contracts, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 327, 327
(2021) (noting that a “[l]ack of legal accountability subsequently translates into low legal risk for
corporate misconduct, which reduces the likelihood of prevention”).
248 See Mariana Pargendler, The Rise of International Corporate Law, 98 WASH U. L. REV. 1765,
1794 (2021).
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as the Court has made it considerably harder to hold corporations liable
for human rights abuses under the ATS, demands on companies to
eradicate human rights abuses from their supply chains have grown.
The chocolate industry has come under significant public pressure for
reform.249 In fact, before or while litigating their cases all the way up
to the Supreme Court, Nestlé and Cargill became signatories to the
United Nations (UN) Global Compact.250 The related UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a soft law framework
that directs companies to “protect, respect and remedy” human rights
and “to comply with all applicable laws,” including on issues of product
safety and quality, forced labor, and child labor.251 Ford is also a
signatory to the Global Compact,252 and while its managers and legal
team might drive it to take an aggressive stance on issues of personal
jurisdiction in an attempt to limit customer suits, many others who have
a stake in the company recognize that dodging accountability on product
safety issues ultimately poses a risk to the company’s brand and
reputation.
Although many view with great skepticism corporate commitments
to voluntary compacts and principles and rightfully express concern
about “bluewashing,” these soft law frameworks are “hardening” and
becoming part of a complex and quickly evolving environment for
multinational corporations.253 Investors and stakeholders bring a global
perspective and impose expectations on corporations to engage with
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
249 See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Chocolate Companies Ask for a Taste of Government Regulation,
WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/31/chocolatecompanies-ask-taste-government-regulation [https://perma.cc/G6EN-X38T]; Child Labor in the
Production of Cocoa, BUREAU OF INT’L LAB. AFFS., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/
our-work/child-forced-labor-trafficking/child-labor-cocoa [https://perma.cc/X8KY-HRF4].
250 See
Our Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOB. COMPACT, https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants [https://perma.cc/K3X3-FBTU].
251 Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec’y Gen. on the Issue of Hum. Rts. & Transnat’l
Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at 6 (Mar.
21, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L56N-7D3E]; Alan S. Gutterman, Embedding Your Business’ Human Rights
Commitment, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 17, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
business_law/publications/blt/2021/05/human-rights [https://perma.cc/D3WK-YMLF].
252 See Our Participants, supra note 250 (search for “Ford” in the field labeled “Search
Participants”); FORD MOTOR CO., UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK
INDEX (2021), https://corporate.ford.com/microsites/integrated-sustainability-and-financial-report2021/files/ir21-ungprf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B42-JDXJ].
253 See GEORGE, supra note 112, at 314–18. For example, the Hague District Court in the
Netherlands recently ordered Royal Dutch Shell plc to reduce its CO2 emissions by at least 45%
relative to 2019 levels by 2030 and grounded the standard of care in the Paris Agreement, the
Guiding Principles, and internationally accepted human rights.
RBDHA 26 mei 2021
(ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5339) (Milieudefensie et al./Royal Dutch Shell) (Neth.), https://
uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5339
[https://perma.cc/
YWQ6-KPDD].
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voluntary soft law frameworks and otherwise prevent social harms to
avoid reputational risk, mitigate liability, maintain their social license to
operate, and contribute to long-term value — reflecting an “enlightened”
view that is not readily captured by the “pro-business” label.254
Yet lessons from the past decade also suggest that there are limits to
what can be achieved consistently, efficiently, and transparently through
corporate law and governance to adapt to increasing corporate rights
and to address corporate externalities without regulation and legal
accountability.255 Most corporations still do not resemble the “corporate
democracy” envisioned by the Court in Citizens United, nor is there
consensus that they should. The continued expansion of rights reflected
in Americans for Prosperity highlights the uncertain fate of regulation
that mandates disclosure. Incentives for corporate boards, managers,
and shareholders to prioritize corporate oversight and compliance, and
to embrace the growing ESG movement and concerns for stakeholders
and social welfare, are connected in complex ways to legal accountability, litigation, and reputation — particularly in a global business
environment. Further, these movements occur through a system oriented toward shareholder interests,256 and with large amounts of
intermediated capital in public corporations.257 Consequently, the shortcomings of the Court’s “pro-business” approach likely cannot be fully or
easily resolved through counter trends in corporate law and governance.
D. Implications and Deeper Questions
This Part has thus far explored how, in many respects, the Supreme
Court’s nominally “pro-business” jurisprudence of the twenty-first
century has trended in the opposite direction of corporate law and governance, and pays little attention to corporate realities and principles.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
254

See, e.g., BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGEWITH
COMPANIES ON THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS 2 (2021),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-engagement-on-humanrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG6K-7T35] (“Unmanaged potential or actual adverse human rights
issues can . . . expose companies to significant legal, regulatory, operational, and reputational
risks.”).
255 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94 (2020) (arguing that “the most effective way” to “ensure
that capitalism works well for all corporate stakeholders” is through “external” laws and government policies); Leo E. Strine Jr., Stewardship 2021: The Centrality of Institutional Investor Regulation to Restoring a Fair and Sustainable American Economy (Oct. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (describing the need for regulation of
institutional investors and corporate externalities).
256 See generally Lund & Pollman, supra note 239 (describing the shareholder-oriented U.S.
system of public company governance).
257 See Gordon, supra note 201, at 12–23 (describing the rise of stewardship by institutional
investors); Strine, supra note 255 (manuscript at 4–13) (describing problems with aligning the
interests of institutional investors and their ultimate beneficiaries).
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It is debatable whether challenges with conceptions of the corporation
are genuine obstacles in reasoning through thorny legal questions or
whether rhetoric about corporations justifies outcomes determined
through other means.258 This Comment has therefore not aimed to
uncover or opine on possible biases or motivations of Justices, but
instead to apply a sharper lens focused on conceptions of the corporation
across different areas of law to understand patterns in the Court’s
jurisprudence and its impact on corporations.
As this approach has highlighted diverging corporate trends and
internal battles, it leads to a larger question: who actually benefits from
the Court’s “pro-business” rulings? A full exploration of this topic could
fill a volume on its own, and generalizations are dangerous, but at least
a few modest observations flow from the preceding discussion.
To start, the business world, and the corporations that inhabit it, is
far more complicated than a unitary term like “pro-business” could
possibly convey. A wide universe of corporations exists and corporations engage in nearly endless forms of activity. Even just looking at
large public corporations, a diverse set of interests in these corporations
is on display in the myriad corporate governance contests of our time.
From hedge fund activists winning proxy fights at Exxon by championing renewable energy strategies259 to Amazon warehouse workers pushing the company unsuccessfully for a diversity audit and board seats,260
we see a range of highly engaged corporate participants and clashing
views on the issue of just what, exactly, is in the “business” interest.261
Ownership structures and trends in stockholding can help to make
some additional observations at a high level about who might benefit
from “pro-business” jurisprudence. First, about half of Americans are
invested in the stock market, but most people who own stock have very
little.262 Less than one third of U.S. households have $10,000 or more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
258 One could observe, for example, that U.S. Supreme Court Justices in recent decades have not
had extensive expertise in corporate and securities laws — it is not the typical background or path
to the Court. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Securities Law in the
Supreme Court, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 113) (on file with
author) (observing that “the Court has not had a Justice with a particular interest in the topic [of
securities regulation] since Powell retired”).
259 Justin Baer & Dawn Lim, The Hedge-Fund Manager Who Did Battle with Exxon — And
Won, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2021, 3:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-managerwho-did-battle-with-exxonand-won-11623470420 [https://perma.cc/KUY9-ZA8U].
260 Matt Day, Amazon Warehouse Workers Push for Changes at Annual Meeting, BLOOMBERG
(May 26, 2021, 2:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/amazonwarehouse-workers-push-for-changes-at-annual-meeting [https://perma.cc/FW2D-T5C3].
261 See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 499, 536 (2016) (“If theorists of the corporation of all stripes can agree on one vision, surely it
is the firm as a site for cooperation among persons with imperfectly aligned aims.”).
262 David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate Purpose, 74 BUS.
LAW. 659, 666 (2019).
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in stock holdings.263 Conversely, “more than 80 percent of the value of
the stock market is held by the wealthiest 10 percent of our
country; . . . and the share held by the entire top 1 percent is twice as
large as the share held by the entire bottom 90 percent.”264 Thus, to the
extent the Court’s jurisprudence empowers corporations, dismantles
their constraints, or enriches them by minimizing their costs and liabilities, it is likely disproportionately serving the interests of the wealthiest
individuals. Particularly when one considers that most people own
relatively little stock and have interests outside of stock ownership
related to employment, consumer contracts, the environment, democratic participation, and so on, it is likely that most shareholders would
not be served by much of the Court’s jurisprudence that increases rights
and limits legal responsibility of corporations.265
Second, putting aside general trends of wealth inequality reflected in
public company stock ownership, another way to parse who might benefit from “pro-business” jurisprudence is to consider that most
Americans hold stock through institutional investors, and a rising
amount of stock ownership is invested through diversified index
funds.266 Institutional owners currently hold 70-80% of all U.S. publicly
traded stock.267 Three big mutual fund complexes now collectively hold
an average stake of more than 20% of large public corporations.268 The
ultimate beneficiaries are unlikely to be served by expansions of
corporate rights, as they have no direct voice in decisions about their
use, and the institutions that they invest through increasingly aim to
minimize systematic risk at low cost, and generally benefit from external
regulations in areas that do so, such as climate change, social stability,
and financial security.269
In contrast to diversified investors who largely “hold the market,”
individuals who hold large corporate stakes in public or private
corporations, including corporate directors and executives who receive
large compensation packages and equity, have more concentrated
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
263
264
265

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870, 1871–73 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds]; Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–84 (2006) (explaining that “universal
owners are thought of as ‘owning the economy,’” id. at 583, and “can be contrasted with
undiversified shareholders, such as inside shareholders and founding-family shareholders,” id. at
584, who are likely to have different “risk preferences and concern over externalities,” id.).
266 See Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 265, at 1872, 1878.
267 Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971,
973 (2019).
268 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 724, 736
(2019).
269 Gordon, supra note 201, at 1.
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interests that may be furthered by “pro-business” jurisprudence. For
example, Ford is a public company but with dual-class stock through
which the founding family still holds a controlling stake.270 Cargill is
one of the largest family-owned private U.S. companies.271 The large
individual shareholders in these corporations, or those with substantial
voting power, likely benefit from at least a significant portion of
“pro-business” decisions as they have voice in the corporation and stand
to gain a proportionately large amount of wealth from holding equity in
corporations relative to other interests and concerns such as salary from
employment, consumer contracts, and so on.272 In closely held
corporations, the large shareholders may be able to control the corporate
levers to direct corporate wealth to themselves as salary or dividends.273
Business executives and directors who get significant compensation
packages from a corporation, and especially those who have
significant managerial control to direct a corporation in line with their
views, are likely also key beneficiaries of the Court’s “pro-business” jurisprudence. For example, although the Court likened corporations to
“associations of citizens” in Citizens United, shareholders generally have
little to no voice in decisionmaking about corporate political activity —
that is an ordinary business decision under corporate law, and the board
of directors and executives have “virtually plenary authority.”274 They
also typically receive outsized compensation packages compared with
average workers, often with equity stakes, and thus stand to disproportionately gain from corporate profit-making, and can do so even when
their companies lag behind the overall market.275 Influential business
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
270 Mike Colias, Ford Tries to Soothe Weary Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2020, 5:09 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ford-tries-to-soothe-weary-shareholders-11589472858
[https://perma.cc/TGB8-XN83].
271 Chloe Sorvino, Silent Giant: America’s Biggest Private Company Reveals Its Plan to Get
Even Bigger, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2018/
10/22/silent-giant-americas-biggest-private-company-reveals-its-plan-to-get-even-bigger-1 [https://
perma.cc/8NH2-EQT9].
272 Nonprofit corporations do not have shareholders, but large individual shareholders or corporations might similarly make large contributions and have significant voice in these organizations.
The largest private U.S. company, Koch Industries, or its principals have been the key funders for
Americans for Prosperity. Shane Goldmacher, How David Koch and His Brother Shaped American
Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/08/23/us/politics/david-kochrepublican-politics.html [https://perma.cc/VDC7-2DLJ]; America’s Largest Private Companies: 2020
Ranking, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/largest-private-companies/list [https://perma.cc/
FV6W-HHXR] (listing Koch Industries as the largest U.S. private company with $115 billion in
revenue and 120,000 employees).
273 See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3:19, 6:3 (rev. 3d ed. 2021); Robert A.
Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099,
1103 (1999).
274 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 187, at 83.
275 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure as Soundbite: The Case
of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2019) (noting “[t]he sizable pay gaps highlighted
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trade organizations often lobby for these executives’ interests and push
a pro-management agenda, sometimes framed through the lens of
serving shareholders or business more generally to minimize the optics
of these internal tensions.276
Ultimately, answering the question of who benefits will vary
depending on the specific case at hand as well as the corporation and its
participants. In the ways discussed here, we can at least start to observe
that what is in the “business” interest is complex and contestable, and
the Court’s jurisprudence not only often misses the realities of corporations and creates internal tensions, but also serves a limited set of business participants’ interests. Significant numbers of shareholders, and
certainly other stakeholders like employees, might often be better off
without decisions that empower corporations and erode their external
constraints.
CONCLUSION
Whether genuine conceptual difficulty or mere rhetoric, the Roberts
Court’s struggle with analogies and realities involving corporations is
reflected in a trend of case law expanding corporate rights and limiting
their exposure to liability. The trend is far from unqualified, but
perceptible in blockbuster cases like Citizens United as well as
lesser-known cases like those from the recent Term that this Comment
examines.
Americans for Prosperity applied earlier freedom of
association rulings to a broad facial challenge from nonprofit organizations seeking to avoid a routine administrative-disclosure regime. The
Court invalidated a regulation for tens of thousands of organizations
without inquiring into to whether they had real people with burdened
privacy and associational interests at stake. Ford affirmed rulings for
plaintiffs and maintained the status quo, but brought to light conceptual
challenges and favorable treatment of corporate defendants in
contemporary doctrine on personal jurisdiction. Nestlé disregarded the
significance of corporate decisionmaking to find the corporate
defendants’ activities outside the reach of the ATS, furthering the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
by the data” from pay ratio disclosures, such as a company in which its “CEO gets paid 5,000 times
more than the typical worker”); Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low
Performance, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 14, 14–15 (2016) (discussing outsized executive
compensation packages at “companies [that] lagged behind the overall market by a large margin
and even lost value for the year,” id. at 15).
276 See Lund & Pollman, supra note 239 (manuscript at 20) (discussing trade associations through
which corporate executives act, such as the Business Roundtable); Alyssa Katz, The Chamber in the
Chambers: The Making of a Big-Business Judicial Money Machine, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 319–
20 (2018) (describing the lobbying and litigation activity of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce);
Brianne J. Gorod, The First Decade of the Roberts Court: Good for Business Interests, Bad for Legal
Accountability, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 721, 724, 728–29 (2017) (observing that the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce has been “remarkably successful” before the Roberts Court, id. at 724, and
this success has been reflected in case law that “has made it more difficult for individuals to hold
businesses accountable when they violate the law,” id. at 729).

266

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:220

Court’s pattern of limiting the viability of ATS claims against corporations for complicity in human rights abuses.
Although not absolute, this trend of expanding rights and narrowing
responsibility supports the “pro-business” reputation that the Roberts
Court has developed. Under current doctrine, corporations have great
power to shape their regulatory environment through political spending
and influence as well as to challenge a host of business regulations using
a panoply of rights. At the same time, corporations often enjoy
favorable procedural rules and interpretations of regulatory constraints.
This Comment’s aim has been to examine a variety of cases through
the lens of corporations and to highlight this “pro-business” pattern as
well as its contradictory relationship with counter trends in corporate
law and governance.
If “business” is equated with corporate
profit-seeking, private ordering, or managerial power, then it might
appear there is no paradox. But if one digs beneath the surface of these
concepts, or takes a more capacious view of “business,” a deep and
growing contradiction emerges between the Court’s business-related
decisions and other currents in business law. The exploration reveals
that the Court’s failures to account for the realities of corporations and
their governance contributes to reasoning that empowers corporations
and erodes their external constraints, but these “pro-business” decisions
do not benefit the business world writ large. The Court’s approach to
corporations may be a detriment to many people who actually
participate in them. Further, this jurisprudence might ultimately
undermine key mechanisms that have developed to balance the various
interests at stake in corporations and temper their negative externalities.
The insights interspersed throughout various dissents and concurrences
in recent cases suggest that a more coherent approach to conceptualizing corporations and their legal rights and responsibilities is possible.
A richer understanding and accounting for the spectrum of corporations,
and their internal laws and governance, could contribute to a different
kind of business-oriented jurisprudence that would serve a broader
group of participants and support their efforts in shaping corporate activity and accountability.

